

Infantry

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The Infantry Squad:
Lethality, Force Protection, and Technology - Page 2


Building a Better Trench:
Rethinking Our Approach to Doctrine - Page 21

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FRONT COVER:

A security force squad leader with Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah pulls security at a landing zone as his team loads a tactical vehicle into a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in Farah Province, Afghanistan, on 26 September 2012. (Photo by SSgt. Jonathan Lovelady, USAF)

BACK COVER:

A Texas National Guardsman provides security as Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunar engineers conduct a quality assurance check at the Narang Girls School on 13 October 2012. The school is nearing completion, and the PRT engineers assist the local Afghan government by conducting quality assurance checks on the construction project. (Photo by TSgt. Christopher Marasky, USAF)

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FEATURES

- 21 **BUILDING A BETTER TRENCH: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO DOCTRINE**
MAJ Stephen J. Tegge
- 24 **MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: CULTURAL AWARENESS IS CRITICAL DURING CRISES**
LTC David Oclander
- 26 **MOTORCYCLES IN THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY: A DOCTRINAL APPROACH TO ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL SUCCESS**
CPT Kyle Stockwell
- 31 **THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATIONS IN THE CLASSROOM**
LTC (Retired) George Hodge

DEPARTMENTS

- 1 **COMMANDANT'S NOTE**
- 2 **INFANTRY NEWS**
- 5 **PROFESSIONAL FORUM**
 - 5 **BASE EXPEDITIONARY TARGETING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS: PROVIDING THE SOLDIER WITH INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES**
Dr. Christina Bates
 - 8 **FIELD GRADE APPRENTICESHIP: S3 ASSIGNMENT CRITICAL TO CAREER PROGRESSION**
MAJ Mark S. Leslie
 - 11 **FACILITATING SUCCESS: EFFECTIVELY PARTNERING WITH THE AFGHAN UNIFORMED POLICE**
1LT Conor Kinhead
 - 14 **THE FUTURITY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION: LSAT PROGRAM PROVIDES LIGHTER WEAPON SYSTEMS WITHOUT DIMINISHING CAPABILITIES**
Jerry Barricks
 - 16 **BOUNCING BACK AFTER A THUMPING: RESILIENCY AMONG GUERRILLA UNITS**
LTC (Retired) Lester W. Grau
 - 19 **SELF-AWARENESS: THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP**
LTC Milford H. Beagle Jr.
- 35 **TRAINING NOTES**
 - 35 **U.S. ARMY RANGER SCHOOL — FLORIDA PHASE**
6th Ranger Training Battalion
 - 36 **PT AND THE 8-STEP TRAINING MODEL: IMPLEMENTING TRAINING MANAGEMENT EVERY DAY**
CPT Darrell E. Fawley III
 - 39 **REPETITIVE, REALISTIC TRAINING KEY**
SGM Patrick M. Ogden
 - 42 **TRAINING LETHALITY THROUGH CAVALRY SQUADRON GUNNERY**
LTC Chris Budihas and 1LT Scott Browne
 - 45 **EGYPTIAN GENERAL MOHAMED FAWZI — PART III: REFLECTIONS ON MISTAKES MADE IN PLANNING, TRAINING, EQUIPPING, AND ORGANIZING EGYPTIAN COMBAT FORMATIONS PRIOR TO THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR**
CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy
- 51 **BOOK REVIEWS**

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Commandant's Note

COL DAVID B. HAIGHT

THE INFANTRY SQUAD

LETHALITY, FORCE PROTECTION, AND TECHNOLOGY

The Army Infantry squad remains the foundation of the maneuver force. We are adept at fighting a determined, adaptive enemy across a wide range of missions and terrain. Today's rifle squads overmatch the enemy in terms of lethality, resilience, tenacity, and the ability to seize and retain the initiative. This Commandant's Note is the first in a three-part series on how we improve the squad and the overall force through enhancements to material, training, and leader development. In this note specifically, I will discuss some of the cutting edge technology, lethality, and force protection measures that give us the decisive edge.

We are currently leveraging our technological potential to meet the threats posed by a tenacious enemy who draws upon an array of conventional, terrorist, and criminal options as he challenges us. He exploits low-tech solutions in an attempt to contest our hi-tech military. Our response to this takes many forms; we train flexible, adaptive, critical thinkers by utilizing blended learning and lead the world in weapons technology. We have undertaken major Infantry vehicle modernization actions. Bradley Fighting Vehicle upgrades include the power train and electrical system, the vehicle's enabled capabilities, and situational awareness enhancements such as improved FBCB2 integration and a common intelligence display. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) has double "V" lower hull changes for increased integral blast protection and protection for the driver, and an M1128 Mobile Gun System (MGS) which means we have three MGS vehicles per MGS platoon and a total of nine for the SBCT.

Our unmanned aerial system (UAS) technology enables the commander to enhance the squad's lethality and save lives by allowing it to put eyes in the sky around and out in front of it. The Puma UAS is a lightweight 13-pound hand-launched system with a 9.2 foot wingspan and electro-optical and infrared sensors to spot enemy units on the move or in ambush positions, or insurgents emplacing improvised explosive devices, roadblocks, or other hazards that could impede movement. Today the number of various UAS employed in theater has grown to more than 4,500. Most of these can operate above normal small arms range, are small enough to be virtually undetected by insurgents, and can still provide high-resolution imagery to give degrees of situational awareness and targeting capabilities that were unimaginable even a decade ago.

We have enhanced the Infantry squad's lethality in a number of other ways. Our defilade target engagement has deprived the enemy of the advantages of firing from cover. Our extended range munitions, sensors, and targeting systems mean that the effective range of our service rifle exceeds that of the AK-47 series of rifles carried by most of our adversaries by at least 100 meters. Today's improved day, night, and thermal optics have materially improved

target acquisition and engagement and enable the shooter to reliably distinguish between friend and foe. The 5.56mm M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round for the M16 and M4 series rifles offers higher muzzle velocity and improved performance against hard targets at greater ranges than the earlier M855 round. We have coupled the rifle's range overmatch with marksmanship training that lets the Soldier effectively engage targets at extended ranges.

Force protection remains a crucial consideration. By improving today's body armor, we have been able to reduce the effects of blunt force trauma, offer better environmental protection, and provide a fire resistant capability not available with earlier protection. Other survivability enhancements include the Revision Military BATLSKIN Modular Head Protection System, a visor and ballistic lower face and jaw protection system, and an Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH) with a ballistic pad that attaches to the rear suspension system of the ACH. This protects that area between the lower edge of the ACH and the collar of the body armor from fragmentation wounds to the neck and lower head. Helmet-mounted sensors now gather data on the effects of IED explosions, which will lead to even more improvements to the helmet and body armor systems. Gunfire locators relying on acoustic and optical data to locate the source of a shot are finding even broader application with deployed forces.

The fielding of a new tactical network, Capability Set 13, began in October. The network includes such state-of-the-art applications as the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical; the Rifleman Radio; the Soldier Radio Waveform; and the Nett Warrior communications system, a Soldier equipment set with android-based smart phones linked with Rifleman Radio, linking the unit command net with a handheld device down to the rifleman. Now the Infantryman will be able to transmit and receive real-time data in time to facilitate the concise, timely decisions that spell success in the fast-paced fight.

These are but a few of the technological, lethality, and force protection initiatives that we are actively pursuing at the Maneuver Center of Excellence as we strive to ensure that Soldiers can deploy swiftly, strike hard, and return home safely. The Commandant's Note for the next issue of *INFANTRY* will focus on training development. We welcome your comments and recommendations and invite you to join us in this effort.

One force, one fight! Follow me!



Infantry News



UAS TECHNOLOGY SAVES LIVES IN COMBAT

KRIS OSBORN

SGT Christopher Harris was conducting a routine reconnaissance mission in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, in 2009 when the Puma unmanned aerial system (UAS) he was operating showed nearby, real-time footage of insurgents planting a roadside bomb along a U.S. Army convoy route.

"We saw them putting in the IED (improvised explosive device) planted in the road. They were holed up in and coming in and out of a house 20 meters away from the dirt road we were traveling on. I watched them for 20 minutes," Harris said, recollecting the incident. "These guys had set an IED two kilometers away from us, and they were waiting for us to drive by for what looked like a planned IED-initiated ambush."

The electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors on the Puma UAS showed live images of the insurgent activity on Harris' laptop-like display screen and antenna, a One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) able to give him advance warning of the nearby threat his convoy was approaching.

The Puma UAS is a 13-pound, portable, hand-launched unmanned system with a wingspan of 9.2 feet and EO/IR sensors able to beam back real-time imagery from nearby combat-relevant locations.

Due to the UAS technology, Harris was able to pinpoint the insurgents' location to within five meters. Then, after carefully checking the area to ensure there were no nearby civilians or additional structures, Harris called in a 155mm artillery strike, destroying the house and ensuring safe passage for his unit's convoy.

"I was able to observe rounds directly hitting the target.

During our battle damage assessment, we saw that the house was destroyed. EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams were then called in to deal with the IED," explained Harris, who was serving as an Infantry Soldier with the 2nd Infantry Division out of Fort Lewis, Wash.

There have been hundreds, if not thousands of instances similar to this throughout the last 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, wherein UAS technology has been proven to bring a game-changing, life-saving capability to forces in combat. In fact, the number of UAS in theater has grown exponentially since the start of the wars, expanding from a handful of systems in 2002 and 2003 to more than 4,500 UAS aircraft in service today.

The unmanned aerial systems currently being used range from larger, medium-altitude systems such as the Gray Eagle and Shadow to small, hand-launched UAS such as the Puma and Raven systems.

A brigade aviation element officer with the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division launches a Puma unmanned aerial vehicle in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, on 25 June 2012.

Photo by SGT Michael J. MacLeod



In each instance, UAS provide commanders and Infantry engaged in conflict with critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, providing electronic “eyes” able to spot danger over a hill or around a corner, thus keeping more Soldiers out of harm’s way.

“I am able to tell my (lieutenant) if we are about to go up a hill... ‘let’s toss a bird up there and see what we’ve got,’ just a quick recon without sending anybody up. If there is nothing dangerous on the mountain, we proceed. Using UAS in this way saves time and energy by not sending Soldiers up there — and you save lives by not endangering somebody,” Harris explained.

Unmanned aerial systems are a dominant weapons system on today’s battlefield, said WO Mike Gray, a UAS program manager.

“We go everywhere and provide overwatch. We can put a UAS up 3,000 feet to watch a convoy. We often fly our UAS missions along routes after route-clearance missions have gone through to make sure routes remain safe for convoys,” said Gray.

Also, UAS such as the Shadow provided overwatch security during the Iraqi elections in January 2009, ensuring important historic activities could not be sabotaged by insurgent attacks, said SSG Catalina Avalos, an NCO with the Washington National Guard.

“We provided 24-hour overwatch on site to be sure there was no insurgent activity, no IEDs being planted, and no suspicious occurrences. In some instances, we have been able to see actual personnel digging holes for IEDs and laying down the wires,” Avalos explained.

Avalos added that if the EO cameras do not specifically catch insurgents in the act of planting an IED, UAS infrared sensors can detect temperature changes in the ground, thus often determining that a roadside bomb has recently been planted.

“We are able to see a difference in ground that has been freshly dug, versus something that has been there a while. So, when you see that, you then have EOD units go to the site to verify if it is, in fact, an IED,” Avalos said. “UAS are one of those types of weapons system that have just revolutionized combat in ways that are unbelievable. Commanders now know almost everything that goes on in their battlespace. We fly aircraft longer than enemies can stay awake.”

UAS also assist with what is called “negative terrain analysis” wherein operators look to see whether elements of the terrain have changed, Avalos added.

Avalos said many of her skills using UAS in combat were sharpened during a six-month training course for UAS operators at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

While UAS operators have a slightly different role compared to UAS maintainers, every student learns every skill during training so as to ensure students are aware of all the nuances involved in UAS deployment. UAS training spans the entire gamut of activity, from systems engineering, UAS sensors, deployment and interference training, Avalos explained.

“I graduated from UAS training in 2008. I love this career and would not trade it for the world. I loved coming out of the schoolhouse and going down range because everything I learned in the school house could be applied down range. Lives were saved down range,” said Avalos.

(Kris Osborn writes for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology.)

FIELDING OF NEW TACTICAL NETWORK BEGINS

KATIE CAIN

The U.S. Army, through its System of Systems Integration Directorate, announced that the first fielding of Capability Set 13 has begun new equipment training with two brigade combat teams (BCTs) of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, N.Y., and Fort Polk, La.

Capability Set 13, or CS 13, is the first fully-integrated package of radios, satellite systems, software applications, smartphone-like devices and other network components that provide an integrated connectivity from the static tactical operations center to the commander on-the-move to the dismounted Soldier. CS 13 marks the first time the Army is delivering network systems as an integrated communications package that spans the entire brigade combat team formation.

New equipment training began in October for the 3rd and 4th Brigade Combat Teams of the 10th Mountain Division, located at Fort Drum and Fort Polk, respectively. Prior to deploying with CS 13 assets, both units will undergo several months of rigorous classroom courses and hands-on experience with the systems.

“These guys have been to Afghanistan and they know what this capability is going to have to do in combat,” said COL Walter E. Piatt, 10th Mountain Division’s deputy commanding general for support. “So who better to get the latest equipment than the 10th Mountain Division?”

CS 13 is ideal for missions in austere environments such as Afghanistan because it provides mobile mission command to all echelons of the BCT.

As U.S. forces continue to draw down in Afghanistan, they will turn over many of their forward operating bases and other infrastructure to the local forces, thus gradually losing fixed



Photos by Claire Heininger

A Soldier with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division uses Capability Set 13 equipment on 10 October 2012. The equipment provides mobile satellite and robust radio capabilities.



network infrastructure locations. CS 13 systems provide mobile satellite and robust radio capability for commanders and Soldiers to take the network with them in vehicles and while dismounted as they conduct combat and security assistance missions. This mobile network greatly reduces the reliance on fixed infrastructure.

“This capability will allow us to remain mobile and will not tie us to fixed facilities,” said Piatt. “Think about what that does operationally and tactically. It doesn’t make you predictable.”

“As I look at upcoming missions, our ability and my ability to communicate with those Soldiers on the ground over extended distances — that’s really what will give us the edge as we go forward,” said COL Sam Whitehurst, commander of the 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, who along with Piatt described the technology as a significant upgrade from what he used during previous deployments over the last decade.

CS 13 is anchored by two major upgrades: mission command on the move, allowing commanders to take the network with them in their vehicles; and bringing dismounted Soldiers into the network, empowering ground troops with a new level of real-time information.

Inside mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles, configured with components of CS 13, commanders will be able to exchange information and execute mission command using mobile communications technologies, rather than having to rely on a fixed infrastructure.

“This capability puts the dismounted Soldier into the network, and that’s something we have not been able to do,” Piatt said. “Not only will we know where each other are, we’ll be able to

Capability Set 13 systems provide mobile satellite and robust radio capability for commanders and Soldiers to take the network with them in vehicles and while dismounted as they conduct security assistance and combat missions.

communicate throughout the entire brigade headquarters. We’ll have constant situational awareness. Then we can turn it on the enemy.”


Capability Set 13 not only introduces new technologies, but also a new approach to how the Army equips units with the network.

For the first time, the Army is delivering network systems not on an individual basis, but as an integrated communications package that spans the entire brigade combat team formation, connecting the static tactical operations center to the commander on-the-move to the dismounted Soldier. By using the Network Integration Evaluations, known as NIEs, to establish an integrated network baseline and to inform training, techniques and procedures, the Army can rapidly incorporate new technology and adapt it based on different mission requirements.

“We’re trying to make the systems we provide flexible enough to give commanders the ability to adjust,” said BG Daniel Hughes, Army director of System of Systems Integration. “The goal is to get the latest technology to these guys as fast as we can and make them as capable as possible.”

Both brigade combat teams will continue to receive CS 13 equipment in incremental phases over the next several months prior to beginning collective training with the entire capability set.

(Katie Cain writes for the System of Systems Integration Directorate. Claire Heiningar also contributed to the article.)



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Professional Forum



BASE EXPEDITIONARY TARGETING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS - COMBINED

PROVIDING THE SOLDIER WITH INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

DR. CHRISTINA BATES

On a summer day in a major metropolitan area in the Middle East, a Soldier scans a small thoroughfare with his Rapid Deployment Integrated Surveillance System (RDISS.) The street is fairly busy. From the left-hand side of the screen, the Soldier sees a little girl stumbling along, apparently weighed down by the backpack she is carrying. The little girl proceeds to a small carnival to his right field of view, and he follows her until she is out of view. Panning back to the same street, the Soldier now sees a man in a black coat walking the same path that the little girl walked. The man seems to have something in his pocket. As a second man approaches him, the man waves him away. Then, reaching into his pocket, the man walks out of view. Seconds later, debris flies across the Soldier's field of view, emanating from the carnival area. The street is now in chaos as people flee the area. The man has just detonated the backpack being carried by the little girl — his own daughter. But this man would not escape justice. Several months later, he was tried in an Iraqi court, and the main evidence used against him was the data from the Soldier's RDISS. It was this incriminating data that would ultimately lead to the man's conviction and sentencing.

The BETSS-C Family of Systems

The RDISS is part of a family of integrated systems known as the Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Systems - Combined (BETSS-C). Fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2008 by the Project Manager, Night Vision/Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (PM NV/RSTA), BETSS-C consistently ranks among U.S. Central Command's top-five priority systems and provides Soldiers with reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting capabilities. BETSS-C includes five systems: the **Force Protection Suite (FP Suite)** — the Long Range

Thermal Imager (LRTI), the Battlefield Anti-Intrusion System (an unattended ground sensor), and the Man-portable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar (MSTAR); the **Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID)** tower; the **Cerberus Mobile Surveillance System**; the **Cerberus Scout** (dismounted version of the Cerberus); and the **RDISS**.

While each of these systems brings its own RSTA and FP capabilities, what makes BETSS-C unique and powerful is the integration of three of the five systems that make up this family of systems. This integration is achieved by the "heart" of BETSS-C — the Standard Ground Station (SGS). The SGS (currently deployed on RAID towers) will provide a common graphical user interface (GUI) for the RAID, Cerberus, and FP Suite. This addition will extend the SGS's integration capability for targeting and surveillance systems and external sensors to enable multi-sensor cross-cueing on all BETSS-C systems. The SGS is also capable of linking to other systems on the Afghan Mission Network and is interoperable with key mission command networks, including



Photos courtesy of author

Soldiers prepare to install a Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Systems - Combined system.

the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A).

Originally conceived in response to a 2007 joint operational needs statement, each of BETSS-C's systems provides the most current RSTA and FP technologies. Fielded since 2005 and integrated into the BETSS-C in 2008, the RAID tower is available in two versions: an 80-foot or 107-foot tower on which a day and night sensor is mounted. RAID provides 360-degree, high-resolution, day/night capabilities and includes the same MSTAR Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) as the FP Suite. The RAID tower is ideal for tracking population behavioral patterns and monitoring named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs).

Like the RAID tower, the Cerberus Mobile Surveillance System also provides cooled infrared (IR) and day cameras as well as an Advanced Radar Surveillance System (ARSS). The Cerberus, with its lower sensor height and far smaller footprint when compared to the RAID, is ideal for use in smaller spaces (i.e., spaces that are not large enough to accommodate a RAID tower). Trailer-mounted, the Cerberus is unmanned and operated remotely. Additionally, the system can be sling-loaded to remote locations via rotary wing aircraft. As with RAID, the Cerberus enables tracking of population behavioral patterns and monitoring of NAIs and TAIs.

The Cerberus Scout is a dismounted version of the trailer-mounted Cerberus. The Cerberus Scout includes a cooled IR and daylight camera, ARSS, laser range finder (LRF), and an IR laser pointer. It is ideally suited for use at observation posts (OPs). Like the Cerberus and the RAID, the Cerberus Scout enables tracking of population behavioral patterns and monitoring of NAIs and TAIs.

The RDISS comprises a suite of fixed, closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras; pan, tilt, and zoom (PTZ) cameras; and a mid-range thermal imager (MRTI). As demonstrated in the carnival detonation case, the RDISS is also capable of storing video that may be used for a number of purposes, including forensics. Working together, the sensors comprising RDISS provide basic security monitoring and an "over-the-wall" capability, enabling robust force protection.

Like the RDISS, the FP Suite comprises several sensors that provide improved situational awareness of perimeter and entry control points, "over-the-wall" coverage of dead space, and forensic exploitation via recording capability. With its pan-tilt-zoom cameras, CCTV cameras, infrared illuminators, GSR, and unattended ground sensor, the FP Suite provides "close-in" video surveillance as well as detection of large vehicles at 36 kilometers, small vehicles at 24 kilometers, and personnel at 12 kilometers. All of the sensors within the FP Suite are tailored to the needs of a specific installation and can include up to 20 sensors in total.

Overall, the sub-systems that comprise BETSS-C were specifically designed to be complementary, thereby achieving



The Cerberus Scout system enables tracking of population behavior patterns and monitoring of named areas of interest and target areas of interest.

two related objectives: maximizing the strengths of each system, while simultaneously ensuring coverage of "dead spots" by employing the complementary sub-systems. When used in this fashion, BETSS-C provides an effective, 360-degree "surveillance umbrella." The RDISS and FP Suite enable "close-in" perimeter surveillance, and, when working in concert with the RAID and Cerberus, these sub-systems facilitate robust, holistic FP and RSTA operations. In light of this, most forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs) employ at least two of the five BETSS-C sub-systems at any given time.

This powerful combination of the BETSS-C systems has led Soldiers and operators to refer to the system as a "one-stop shop" that, when employed correctly, "lets nothing get in" to a FOB or other secured area. In many instances, Soldiers have noted that BETSS-C has prevented ambushes and complex attacks and, thus, has often contributed to saving lives in theater. In fact, it has been noted that enemy activity in the vicinity of a FOB or COP decreases by approximately 60 percent when BETSS-C systems are installed and employed properly.

State-of-the-Art BETSS-C Training

No system, no matter how technologically advanced, can be used to its full potential without being linked to a larger battle strategy and without being operated by trained, knowledgeable personnel. Since early in the initial fielding of BETSS-C, PM NV/RSTA has invested in the development of best-in-class leadership awareness and understanding training for unit leaders and operator training for Soldier-operators. Through its Doctrine and Tactics Training (DTT) team, the BETSS-C program provides on-site guidance (home station, combat training center, or post-mobilization location) and training to help corps, division and brigade leaders, and their battle staffs understand how to effectively incorporate BETSS-C's full suite of capabilities into unit planning processes. Because the DTT focuses on system employment in accordance with current Army doctrine, a division or corps commander will develop a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities their brigade combat teams will gain when employing the BETSS-C system and will also understand how it fits into their overall strategy.

At the unit level, leaders will have developed an understanding of BETSS-C's capabilities and limitations, including how to

leverage BETSS-C as a force multiplier, as well as how to incorporate BETSS-C into planning processes for force protection and information collection in accordance with FMs 3-37 and 3-55, respectively. Unit leaders will also develop an understanding of BETSS-C's potential for interoperability with other common battlefield systems as well as the myriad of opportunities for BETSS-C operator training. At the close of a session with the BETSS-C DTT, a unit leader will have a clear understanding of how to leverage BETSS-C to achieve larger, strategic objectives on the battlefield.

At the operational level, the BETSS-C training team, primarily located at the BETSS-C training facility in Fayetteville, N.C., provides comprehensive schoolhouse and on-site training (via its mobile training program) to units prior to their deployment and to field service representatives (FSRs), trainers/installers (T/Is). For FSRs and T/Is, the BETSS-C training team provides a 15-week curriculum at its schoolhouse in Fayetteville. This training includes hands-on work with actual BETSS-C systems to reinforce learning and skill development. T/Is may also access refresher training and associated materials via the training team's online training that leverages the popular, user-friendly Black Board application. For contractor-operators, the training team provides a 15-day training curriculum at its schoolhouses in Fayetteville or Fort Leonard Wood, Mo. For Soldier-operators, the training team brings the training to the units via its unique mobile training trailers (MTTs), which are fully customized and self-contained, retrofitted semi tractor-trailers fully equipped with system emulators to enable hands-on training. Like the contractor-operator training, the Soldier-operator training includes a 15-day curriculum that combines classroom and hands-on training to reinforce learning and aid in enduring skill development. Contractor and Soldier-operators also have access to the training team's online training tool where they can access and take full courses, as well as download refresher materials.

BETSS-C: Looking Ahead

Since its initial fielding in the fall of 2008, the BETSS-C family of systems has been viewed as an absolutely essential capability for base defense and has made significant contributions to saving lives in both Operation New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom. Additionally, in recognition of its systems engineering excellence, particularly regarding the interoperability of three of its systems, BETSS-C won the 2009 Department of Defense Top 5 Program Award. As stated earlier, the system's SGS will enable intra-BETSS-C interoperability, which will facilitate a unit's ability to share BETSS-C data among numerous systems. Building on these successes, PM NV/RSTA is currently working to further integrate BETSS-C, via the SGS capability, with other key RSTA systems such as the Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, the Persistent Ground Surveillance Systems, the Persistent Threat Detection System, and the unmanned aerial systems. This integration will enable the passing of data among disparate systems, thereby strengthening a unit's ability to create an effective persistent surveillance capability. Anticipating the Soldier's continued need for integrated, actionable information, BETSS-C's proof of concept has set a firm foundation for future interoperability capability among numerous RSTA systems.

To learn more about PM NV/RSTA and the BETSS-C family of systems, please visit the NV/RSTA Web site at <http://peoiews.app.army.mil/nvrsta/index.html>

To learn more about the BETSS-C DTT, contact Philip Thompson at thompson_philip@bah.com. To learn more about BETSS-C training, contact Steve Beltson at sbeltson@caci.com.

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INFANTRY NEEDS ARTICLES

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FIELD GRADE APPRENTICESHIP:

S3 ASSIGNMENT CRITICAL TO CAREER PROGRESSION



MAJ MARK S. LESLIE

Serving as a battalion or brigade operations officer — the S3 — is one of the most developmental and important assignments a major will have.

An S3 assignment is critical to career progression. More importantly, the experience and insight gained from serving in that position are critical in forming the future combat formation leaders of the Army. I served as a battalion and brigade S3 in combat in Afghanistan with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

To be a field grade officer — and perform as one — requires the leadership, patience, and tough but capable tutelage of a battalion or brigade commander. It also requires a major who is mature enough to accept this apprenticeship.

There are a few definitions that are relevant to this discussion that are worthy of reprint, even if they may be tired and overused. In my opinion, leadership is an often abused word in the Army vernacular. Many discuss and reference it, but far too few officers actually exercise it when in a staff position. Many often forget or overlook the fact that they are in a leadership position and disregard basic fundamentals of leadership just because the title of commander is absent from a signature block. Staff officers are still leaders, and the influence they have on an organization is heavy. Army Regulation 600-100, *Army Leadership*, defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” An S3 that does not do this is failing the commander, the organization, and his subordinates. The S3 does this in his interaction with the staff on behalf of the commander in the execution of the commander’s guidance. The S3 is the whip or the hammer used by the commander for the staff to develop the training plan, orders, and synchronization of the guidance given into a coherent, reasonable, feasible, and executable plan with the resources available.

As a field grade officer working for a battalion or brigade commander, it is worthy to consider oneself an apprentice of the trade. *Webster’s Dictionary* defines an apprentice as: “one bound by indenture to serve another for a prescribed period with a view to learning an art or trade.” What better definition could describe the period of service as an S3? An operations officer is bound to serve the commander to the best of his ability for a prescribed period of time and should feel an implied duty to learn as much as possible from that commander about their trade as possible. The commander has a way ahead or vision

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that he wants that organization to go in based off his experience and mission at hand. Not only should the S3 perform, but he should observe, listen, annotate, and record the many lessons learned through interaction with the commander.

I learned a great deal throughout my time as an S3 and will try to convey some of those lessons learned in this article.

Role of the S3

It is important for every new S3 to realize, completely understand, and fully embrace the fact that they are not in command. The S3 is a unique position. In many respects, the S3 is responsible for everything but in command of nothing. There is one battalion or brigade commander, and that is not you. There are company commanders, and that is not you. The S3 exists to fulfill the vision of what that battalion or brigade should be doing to either execute or prepare for its wartime mission — period. Remember the definition of leadership: “while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization?” Well, here is where it comes into play. The S3 can offer advice, observations, or ways to improve that vision, but the bottom line is that it’s the commander’s formation. The S3 is there to serve him.

Synchronize the Staff

The main role or mission of the S3 is to synchronize the battalion or brigade’s training or operations by harnessing the staff to write the orders, produce the products, develop the training, anticipate the obstacles or friction points, develop courses of action to deal with the obstacles, find and maintain the resources to conduct training, and wage war in accordance with the commander’s guidance. Synchronize the staff with the commander, and you will synchronize the unit.

Exercise Leadership

In order for the S3 to harness and synchronize the staff appropriately, the S3 must know the staff — the entire staff, NCOs included. Everyone on the staff has strengths and weaknesses. Knowing these strengths and weaknesses helps the S3 assign tasks for maximum output and efficiency. Demand excellence from them. It is important for them to understand that the product or service produced by them — or not produced by them — directly affects Soldiers on the battlefield, the professional reputation of the unit, and the

accomplishment of a mission. Everything they do is important; make them feel important — because they are. Earn their loyalty through your actions. The staff will occasionally fail; it's a fact and cannot be avoided. Take responsibility when a mission or task does not get accomplished to standard. It is a cardinal sin to shift the blame to a subordinate. You know who or what is to blame and more than likely, so does your boss. The difference is that he probably does not care. It's not about blame; it's about the failed mission or substandard performance on a task. All he cares about is that something was not performed to standard or not completed, and he has one guy to point the finger at and get it fixed — most of the time, that guy is the S3. That is the life of an S3. Go back, get the project officer or NCO and get it fixed. Provide the proper guidance however it is best received. Providing proper guidance is an art and not meant to imply micromanagement. Some subordinates will require more guidance than others. Giving direction or guidance to subordinate staff members is an art and relies heavily on the relationship the S3 has with his commander. Knowing how he thinks, how he operates, and how he receives information best is important. Leave enough flexibility in guidance to give the subordinate the ability to exercise some creativity and initiative. This is one of the nuances of good staff work — letting subordinates take guidance and run with it. Assume that risk — it is worth it.

Cultivate Loyalty

Cultivate loyalty among the staff. The staff members are Soldiers, and most sincerely want to do the best they can. Very few Soldiers wake up and inherently want to do mediocre or bad work. They want to be challenged, do a good job, and be praised. They also want to be led, and their leader is the S3. Provide the proper guidance and allow them that flexibility to perform. They will surprise you with their creative and ingenious ways to take your basic idea and improve it; nine times out of 10 they will not disappoint you. Loyalty goes both ways — show it to them, and you will earn it from them. Soldiers will go out of their way to serve an inherently good leader, regardless of faults. Do them justice, protect them, lead them, and perform for them, and they will do the same for you.

Every Soldier Has a Sergeant

The sheer volume of tasks required of an S3 on a daily basis is intimidating. Prioritization of tasks, delegation of authority, and avoiding micromanagement are key tools to success. As S3, you will have to gauge your boss and determine what you are expected to do personally, what can be delegated, what can be tasked out, and what can be accomplished through oversight. Early on, prepare to be overwhelmed until you figure out what tasks belong to whom and what is the vetting process for product refinement. Your operations sergeant major (SGM) is a key component to this. His experience and ability to motivate the staff and get results is key to success. Develop a good relationship with your SGM. Invest the

time; it will deliver good returns. Determine his strengths and weaknesses and capitalize on his strengths. He wants the S3 to succeed. "Every officer has a sergeant" is one of the best Army maxims; the operations SGM is the S3's sergeant. Use him — he is wise counsel, a confidant, and sounding board. If need be, he is also an enforcer. When a fellow staff member fails to perform or produce, there is no better "motivator" than for a SGM to confront and demand he perform. Rare is the officer, regardless of rank, that will take this sublime hint lightly. When a SGM stands in an office door and informs a staff officer that he has failed the team, it is a professional embarrassment and rarely needs to be repeated with any officer worth their salt. All of my SGMs were extremely talented and were in the vetting and approval chain for almost all products developed. They were for all intents and purposes — field-grade officer quality, equally talented, and capable.

Delegation

A quick daily huddle doling out tasks, updates, and priorities is paramount. Nothing is better than actual face-to-face meetings where subordinates can hear the priorities straight from their leader. Priorities and efforts often change due to events, and these meetings allow the S3 to communicate this to the staff and coordinate and synchronize their work and efforts. E-mail is not the way to communicate commander's intent. It may be a good follow up or reminder, but there is nothing more genuine than walking by, sitting down in a chair, and giving subordinates undivided attention to what they are working on for you and your commander. I often left the meetings smarter and more confident in their progress, and I hope they gleaned some better insight into what we wanted from them.

Develop Relationships

As a battalion or brigade S3, it is important to develop rapport and cultivate relationships with fellow S3s to your left and right as well as to your higher. As a battalion S3, I talked to the brigade S3 daily in garrison and in combat. As the brigade S3, I talked to the J3 nightly as part of my personal daily battle rhythm. Often, I would talk to the J3 throughout the day on a variety of issues, but these were usually immediate issues. The nightly "chat" was really a situation report (SITREP) of what I knew to be important to our higher headquarters (HQ) and to accurately portray the state of the "BCT fight." These nightly discussions often provided me insight and perspective of our higher HQs and helped me look ahead, see upcoming priorities, and get clarity on important issues. They proved immensely important to me in my time as the BCT S3. These informal updates often led to compromise and the explanation of "why" by both parties, which resulted in a better working relationship as well as the mission accomplishment in a combined joint task force (CJTF), international joint commission (IJC), and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) context.

A technique that cultivates positive relationships with higher HQ staff is to get into the habit of developing a schedule to push pertinent information to geographically separated counterparts.

This gives them situational awareness on your unit, helps them in their efforts, and allows them to speak about your unit and what they are doing with direct input from you. They are going to anyway; you may as well assist them with "ground truth." Nightly distribution of story boards and situation reports shared with the next higher HQ staff may help you when you need something. They are hungry for information; help them get it.

The S3 "Fight"

As a BCT S3, my fight in Operation Enduring Freedom was really a lateral and upward fight. I had to synch the efforts of multiple battalion task forces to meet the BCT commander's intent and other organizations operating in our AO laterally as well as with higher. The synchronization of limited assets across a very large area of operations was a daunting task. To do this required a degree of compromise on operations by all task forces and intense staff synchronization by the BCT staff.

Know lethal and non-lethal targeting — it is the essence of your operations. The S3 must synchronize the two efforts to achieve the desired effect. The S3 must be intimately involved in the process and synthesize the two. If you are not involved in both, you cannot synchronize the unit's fight across the spectrum of counterinsurgency operations.

S3 battlefield circulation is critical in developing perspective, but it must be balanced with staff responsibilities and obligations. Find a project or mission that is a priority but one the commander just cannot keep on his plate. You will contribute to the unit fight and develop the situational awareness required of your job. Don't be a battlefield tourist! When you go out, have an agenda and do something with the information and observations when you return. Make every trip outside the wire or to the training area fruitful for you and the commander. Go out with something and come back with something.

Commander battlefield (or training area) circulation is critical to his ability to fight the unit. It is the job of the S3 to let subordinate commanders know what the old man is looking for on these visits. The S3 has unique insight on what hot topics and priorities the commander wants to address and what his expectations are for the visit. Letting the subordinate commanders know will assist in developing rapport that is critical to performing your duties.

Additionally, own rehearsals! As an S3, rehearsals are what we do. The final full dress rehearsal may seem like a big show, but the beauty of a rehearsal is the knowledge and confidence the staff develops in preparation for the rehearsal. Always do a rehearsal with key staff members prior to presenting to the boss. Write a script and convey the operation with confidence. Anticipate friction points and questions and develop solutions prior to the rehearsal. If you do your war gaming correctly, this can be a real exercise for the staff to know the plan as well as the commanders.

VIP visits, while deployed or in training, are a fact of life and often unavoidable. Work with the deputy commander and executive officer to find a way to make these visits fit with

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the unit rhythm and effort. Find out what the agenda is for the visitors and tailor the itinerary of the visit to accommodate them and their expectations. Prepare your units and rehearse the visit as you would a combat operation. They are coming anyway, so make it worthwhile. Do your homework, develop talking points, and determine what you want the visitor to leave with. It goes without saying that all units want a visitor to leave with a positive impression — what else? Also consider what they can do for you? Develop a standard operating procedure for VIPs, brief them, and ensure they leave with what they came for — it will be worth the effort.

The job of operations officer is a challenging time in the career of a professional officer. For majors to really develop into the future combat formation leaders of our Army, this time needs to be coupled and balanced with a genuine desire to develop through the interaction with commanders. We are their apprentices. It will not always be a pretty affair. You do not have to like each other; the Army does not function on friendship. It functions on the chain of command and the accomplishment of the mission as best as can be done. Genuine and sincere hard work on the behalf of the S3 for the commander and unit will, in most cases, develop into mutual respect and admiration. I was fortunate to work for two very demanding commanders that drove me hard not only for the mission but for my own personal development as a potential future battalion commander. One can't be thin-skinned as an S3 — you can't afford it and neither can the formation. In most cases, I think it is fair to say that the pressure and demands for excellence that commanders levy on their S3 and the results that come when those demands are not met are not personal. Be a professional — just be a field grade officer — fix it and move on. We owe them that allegiance and passion to our profession without the drama of personal feelings. I came into the job a major and left a field grade — there is a difference.

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FACILITATING SUCCESS:

EFFECTIVELY PARTNERING WITH THE AFGHAN UNIFORMED POLICE

1LT CONOR KINKEAD

The longevity of success made today on the ground in Kandahar City, Afghanistan, depends largely upon the capacity of local national forces (LNF) to maintain and build upon such success. Coalition forces (CF), partnered with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), have created a more stable Kandahar City for the Afghan people. That success has been contingent, in large part, upon force density of CF partnered with ANSF at established checkpoints throughout the city.

At present, combined planning and patrolling have become commonplace, along with many independent Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) operations. There are numerous police substations (PSS) established in and around Kandahar City in addition to various police checkpoints. These police structures are meant to control critical lines of communication along key roads leading into Kandahar City as well as deny terrain and villages from the Taliban. The police have become very well resourced through their improving logistical channels. They have taken ownership of security away from CF and now take on the bulk of that responsibility themselves. Traffic control points (TCPs),

community policing, and deliberate operations have become standard for the AUP in a city decisive to the aspirations of the Taliban. Where there was once widespread volatility, today there are isolated attacks that provide no real tactical gains. The AUP have increasingly become a more professionalized and capable force.

Through the limited lens of one platoon in one part of greater Kandahar City, it can be difficult to see the widespread progress. It is particularly difficult to see progress over the course of each passing day of a yearlong deployment. However, with a broader view of the previous nine months, the gains are apparent. Whether it has been the increasing standards and discipline of

AUP patrolmen; their leaders lessening deference when discussing security; interactions of AUP with village elders; or the eagerness of AUP commanders to learn and become more proficient at their job, all have illustrated a force more capable to deter Taliban elements while they attempt to regenerate and reclaim Kandahar City. The effort to create this current picture of ANSF capacity has been a combined focus for units in country today.

There are many different elements of CF that serve one unified purpose for peace and stability in Afghanistan. There are a multitude of units that work to increase the AUP's professionalism and security capacity. Military Police (MP) units partner with PSS commanders daily to improve their organizational leadership from planning operations to sustainment logistics. Company- and troop-level leaders interface with various AUP commanders to build common operating pictures and set focuses. Security force assistance teams (SFAT) work with higher AUP leadership to support broader planning and operations. Finally, the maneuver platoons serve a vital role at AUP checkpoints by partnering with Afghan soldiers to increase security along routes and in villages. It is from a platoon checkpoint where the perspective of this article is formed.

As a traditional maneuver platoon, preparation for deployment involved many ranges, live fires, platoon and squad situational training exercise (STX) lanes, a rotation through the Joint Readiness Training Center (Fort Polk, La.), and more ranges. Leaders were also encouraged



Photos courtesy of author

An Afghan Uniformed Police checkpoint commander discusses route selection with the author, 1LT Conor Kinkead, in preparation for a deliberate clearance mission.



An Afghan Uniformed Police checkpoint commander shows a subordinate leader the route his element will take during an upcoming mission.

to engage in professional reading. Carl Forseberg's article "The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar" (December 2009, Institute for the Study of War) and David Kilcullen's "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency" provided insightful knowledge for what to expect from the enemy as well as what to expect in the counterinsurgency fight. Cultural and language training facilitated a basis to establish rapport, build connections, and create relationships with village elders. After action review (AAR) comments from deployed units refined focuses and managed expectations. Ultimately, when deploying, the focus is primarily on accomplishing the mission and keeping Soldiers alive and healthy.

In the initial segments of the 2011 fighting season in Kandahar City, much of the focus was on force density and flooding areas of concern with CF and AUP. Efforts were put into developing the AUP's capabilities, but much of this was predicated upon SFATs and MPs taking the lead effort. With AUP partnered on every patrol, maneuver platoons established a presence, engaged locals, found caches, destroyed improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and engaged the enemy. However, as the fighting season progressed, the

correlation between stable and capable AUP substations and security became increasingly apparent. In areas with strong AUP leadership, many caches and IEDs were found. IED detonations and small arms attacks were isolated and rare. With an increasingly capable AUP force, local nationals would turn to them to solve issues and conduct community policing. As a result, they would gain the trust and respect of the people, which would then lead to increased reporting regarding any Taliban activity. Some checkpoints and leaders were better than others at this, and some lacked understanding and training for how to build an operational picture and deter enemy activity. But after a busy fighting season, partnership efforts began to take hold, and focus began to shift from security operations to professionalization of the AUP.

Initially, training consisted of improving AUP's competency on tasks that were essential to their current operations. Training varied from searching vehicles and persons at TCPs to conducting counter-IED techniques, medical treatments, ranges, movement formations and compound clearing. Many of these training tasks aligned with broader plans for training AUP and worked in conjunction with more formalized training

conducted by the MPs. The audience for this training was typically those manning the various checkpoints positioned around our area of responsibility. These training events occurred weekly and built up stronger relations between CF Soldiers and their Afghan partners, and they also conveyed a sense of shared responsibility. At training events, leadership from the various checkpoints would convene to discuss security and operations over the course of the previous and following weeks. At first, many of these discussions were CF led and directed, but over time as AUP became more independently active in patrolling, they began to offer multiple perspectives regarding enemy activities and insight into future operations.

On our initial patrols, AUP were typically positioned to intercept the local populace and generally acted as an outer cordon during key leader engagements (KLEs) and street-level engagements. Their leaders would sit quietly as the CF patrol leader engaged local nationals, collecting atmospherics and information requirements or communicating specific talking points. However, as training progressed, the AUP became more interactive on patrols; discipline on patrols continued to improve along with uniform standards. The leaders

were engaging local nationals while the CF patrol leader controlled security for his AUP counterpart. Ultimately, the role of CF leaders on patrols and at checkpoints became that of a facilitator rather than that of a doer.

Being effective in an area of operation during a counterinsurgency fight, particularly at a platoon checkpoint, requires leaders and Soldiers to conduct a multitude of tasks, many of which are outlined in Kilcullen's "Twenty-Eight Articles." Some of those tasks on patrol involve being respectful and kind to local nationals, engaging village elders and key influencers, adjusting or reducing security posture while on patrols, maintaining professional appearance, and having focused objectives. Other tasks at checkpoints involve running a capable and sustainable living area, having a good base defense plan, developing intelligence, planning operations, enforcing standards and discipline, and training constantly to improve. These daily tasks are something all platoons and units strive to accomplish, but how effective coalition forces are at these counterinsurgency tasks is not nearly as important in the long run as it is for the AUP.

Simply being a capable force that can search vehicles and fire their weapons is not enough to sustain security gains. The Afghan Uniformed Police had to understand, adopt, and believe in the principles of a counterinsurgency fight. They had to become experts at that fight, and they needed to be able to execute at a sustainable rate. This focus is where CF leadership interactions with AUP leadership play a key role. It is not enough to do the counterinsurgency fight; leaders must facilitate the counterinsurgency fight through the AUP. At the leadership level, that means being the guiding hand that ensures those counterinsurgency tasks are accomplished daily by the AUP; at the Soldier level, that means being disciplined and consistently setting the right example for the AUP.

In all of this, establishing

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relationships is critical to ensuring the AUP are genuinely invested. It is not enough to simply talk with AUP commanders about a counterinsurgency fight; Afghan leaders must believe their CF counterparts and want to follow through on their guidance. Relationships of trust, friendship, and shared experience are essential. Drinking chai, eating food, and living together are not enough; simply being there is not enough. Effective partnered relationships rely on trust and follow-through. CF leaders must do what they say they will do and genuinely look out for the best interest of their AUP counterparts and their Soldiers.

Strong relationships, focused priorities, and consistent support are the reasons for the AUP's growing competence in

Kandahar City today. The AUP have adopted the principles and are executing key tasks associated with sustainable security growth. Partnered CF elements continue to facilitate the counterinsurgency fight and provide guidance and leadership when needed as well as enablers that allow room for security growth and AUP progression. As CF tailor back force numbers and these enablers become less prevalent, AUP will test their improved security capacity on a Taliban insurgency that remains determined. However, the insurgency now faces a force that is different than the AUP faced in previous years. They have increased competence in security operations, have a multitude of organic enablers to support their efforts, possess strong and experienced leadership at various PSS' and checkpoints, and most importantly, have the trust and confidence of the people in their battlespace. CF efforts will continue to cultivate this positive trend as we begin to step back and facilitate the AUP's step forward.

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An AUP checkpoint commander discusses an upcoming mission with his patrolmen and coalition forces.



THE FUTURITY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

JERRY BARRICKS

LSAT Program Provides Lighter Weapon Systems Without Diminishing Capabilities

Over the course of 237 years, the U.S. Army has made significant changes to the primary weapons employed by its warfighters. With each leap forward, the ability to provide effective fire on our adversaries has increased. We have progressed from hand-loaded muskets to fully cased ammunition fired from bolt action rifles, semiautomatic rapid fire weapons to fully automatic weapons, and now to our current M4 carbine with all the accessories.

One of the biggest challenges in the past has been how to reduce the size and weight of a weapon system without sacrificing capability. Today's warfighters are faced with an ever-growing equipment list that is designed to provide them with the latest and most efficient equipment to complete the mission. The average Soldier load consists of a rucksack, weapon, ammunition, helmet, and other gear; the total weight can range from 63 to more than 130 pounds depending on the variables of mission type, duration, and environment. The weight a Soldier is carrying has a direct impact on his ability to perform his mission. For example, Infantry Soldiers carrying a load of 101 pounds for 12.5 miles had a decrease of 26 percent in marksmanship accuracy (number of targets hit), a 33 percent increase in distance from the target center, and an increase in back pain. Consequently, any new weapon system must take into consideration how the weapon interacts

Above, a Soldier engages a target with a prototype of a light machine gun during a unit assessment at Fort Benning, Ga., in October 2011.

Photo by Eric Kowal

with the warfighter's load. Lighter weapon weight — with less Soldier fatigue — provides a corresponding increase in accuracy during target engagement. Reduced recoil enhances the capability to engage multiple targets under time constraints. Lighter and less bulky ammunition multiplies the number of rounds a Soldier can carry without increasing his load, thus increasing number of targets he can effectively engage.

The latest leap forward is both a weapon system and a change in the technology and materials. In 2004, the Lightweight Small Arms Technologies (LSAT) Army Technologies Objective (ATO) program started with the purpose of providing Soldiers with a lighter individual weapon system without diminishing the current capabilities. The Joint Service Small Arms Program (JSSAP), which falls under the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC), is tasked with the main effort for LSAT. The JSSAP is chartered to synchronize new material requirements that have a joint application and to maintain an awareness of small arms efforts as well as planned technology and acquisition efforts.

How to reduce the weight of a weapon system is not as simple as it may seem. Engineers started from scratch with a "clean slate" design. Modeling and simulation was critical to the design of the weapon system. Engineers designed the weapon and chose materials that would be strong enough to do the job, but they did

not over design it, which would have increased the weight. Every part and subsystem is evaluated for function and weight. The original housing for the weapon was made of reinforced plastic. It was then changed to all-aluminum; this change saved weight and increased durability. According to Kori Phillips, a project officer with ARDEC, the weapon was designed to be lightweight. "Every time we could shave an ounce off, we did," he said. "If something was going to add weight, we had to decide if it was worthwhile."

Although the original intent of the LSAT ATO was to reduce the weight of the weapons and ammunition, JSSAP added the goal of reducing maintenance and training requirements with the intent to make a weapon that was simpler with fewer parts to disassemble, clean, and replace.

The LSAT Cased Telescoped Light Machine Gun (CT LMG) is a gas operated, air cooled, belt fed, light machine gun with fixed headspace and quick change barrel feature. The weapon fires from the open bolt position and can be used in the automatic rifleman (AR) or LMG position for squad configurations.

It is made of the same general materials as the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) — steel, aluminum, and plastic, but it's how the materials are used and the design of the parts/system that provide the savings in weight.

Of course, you can reduce a weapon system to the bare minimum and still be plagued with a weight question. What about the ammunition? Here is where the LSAT really lends itself to a leap forward in technology. The current 5.56mm, 200-round drum of ammunition for the M249 SAW weighs 6.2 pounds. The same number of rounds for the LSAT LMG comes in at 3.2 pounds. Using a new way of looking at how the projectile is packaged, the JSSAP has developed a two-path approach. The first is caseless ammunition, and the other is cased telescoped ammunition. Caseless ammunition is still in development with the projected outcome of a 50-percent weight reduction and a 40-percent decrease in volume. Cased telescoped ammunition is a mature technology using a lightweight, cylindrical polymer case as opposed to brass, which provides a 37-percent reduction in ammunition weight and a 12-percent reduction in volume. Both types of projectile will significantly reduce the weight carried by the warfighter.

In September 2011, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Maneuver Battle Lab (MBL) conducted a comparative assessment of the CT LMG against the current M249 SAW. Infantry Soldiers along with Military Police examined the CT LMGs in a variety of operational scenarios. The scenarios were designed to provide the warfighter the venue for critical comments and gain user feedback on the system's design. The MBL assessment addressed Soldier load, an identified gap from the squad

capabilities-based assessment. While there are many components to a Soldier's load that contribute to overall weight, the weapon and ammunition are key to mobility. The assessment found that the CT LMG, with its reduced weight and ammunition, is a potential solution to fill this gap. In December 2011, the MCoE drafted a memorandum of support for the LSAT technology, recommending the Army conduct forward operational assessments (FOAs) to gain feedback from Soldiers currently deployed. It also recommended that the Army invest in the evaluation of systems firing different caliber rounds to determine the weight savings provided by this new technology.

What is the future for LSAT? From a technical point of view, the technology is applicable across the full range of small caliber weapons and ammunition, from carbines to heavy machine guns and beyond. The reduced weight of the weapons and ammunition, while providing dismounted Soldiers a critical weight reduction, could also reduce the load for aviation platforms, small robotic vehicles, and other platforms to include the ones that provide logistics support.

From an operational point of view, the two (SAW) gunners who will carry a 40-percent lighter load, will undoubtedly have more energy as well as be more lethal,

more flexible upon contact, more situationally aware, and more capable of offensive action. A 40-percent weight savings is critical to the squad's physical, mental, and operational effectiveness.

"Consider for a second those forces deployed to Afghanistan; they are conducting daily dismounted patrols and carrying a full combat load on the backs of the nine-man Infantry squad," said COL Robert Choppa, director of the MBL and team chief of the Measures of Effectiveness Fire Team for the **Squad: Foundation of the Decisive Force** initiative. "These patrols are all under brutal weather, extreme hot or cold, with high winds and seasonal rain. These combat missions are in complex terrain that requires foot movement for several miles up unimproved dirt paths — paths going up over 30 percent inclines where tripping will break an ankle, where falling will require medical evacuation, and where every step is dangerous.

"The threat situation requires or demands many of these operations being conducted at night to afford the squad to get to positions of advantage," said Choppa. "Many of these foot operations are under conditions where the squad can make contact with the threat force at any time. Under these circumstances, the 40-percent savings in load burden is absolutely decisive! LSAT is a tremendous boost to the formation effectiveness of the dismounted Infantry squad."

Jerry Barricks is the team chief of the Soldier Team, Experimentation Branch, Maneuver Battle Lab, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Ga.



Figure 1 — Cased Telescoped Ammunition

BOUNCING BACK AFTER A THUMPING:**RESILIENCY AMONG GUERRILLA UNITS**

LTC (RETIRED) LESTER W. GRAU

“If we have to fight, we will fight. You will kill 10 of our men and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who will tire of it.”

— Ho Chi Minh
*Prison Diary*¹

“As a nation, we believed that history repeats itself. What happened in the 19th century to the invading British would also be the fate of the Soviet invaders. Philosophically, the Soviets believed that history is unidirectional, progressive and does not repeat itself. History did repeat itself and we did prevail.”

— General Abdul Rahim Wardak

*The Other Side of the Mountain:
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War*²

Ho Chi Minh led the movement against the reestablishment of French colonial rule in Vietnam after World War II. The French Indochina War was a fight between different ethnic groups with different ideologies or faiths. The Soviet-Afghan War was also a fight between different ethnic groups with different ideologies or faiths. Both contests demonstrate that guerrilla warfare is a test of will and commitment.³ Yet, will and commitment are not always enough to prevent defeat. What compels the guerrilla to fight on after tactical defeat? Is it a natural and cultural thing? Is it ideology or religion? Is it monetary or political gain? Is it preservation of the family at the sacrifice of the individual? Why do some guerrilla movements survive and grow after severe defeats while others quickly fold after an apparently minor setback? Why are some peoples better at it than others? The answer may lie in history, with its thousands of guerrilla movements throughout recorded time.

What is a Guerrilla Force?

After the past decade, this seems a pretty obvious question. During this decade the United States has been involved in four guerrilla wars — one in Iraq, one in the Philippines, one in Columbia, and one in Afghanistan. The Iraqi guerrilla movement originated with the government-trained, government-armed, and government-led Fedayeen organization. It spread into a large-scale resistance backed by neighboring states, outside organizations (such as al Qaeda), religious groups, ethnic groups, dismissed soldiers, malcontents, and criminals. The Philippine insurrection was the continuation of a decades-old resistance by Islamic peoples. The Columbian insurgency began as a communist movement which supported itself through the

production and sale of narcotics. It has evolved into a narcotics syndicate that occasionally justifies its behavior by citing a communist ideology. The guerrillas in Afghanistan organized themselves in part based on shattered conventional Taliban and al Qaeda forces, but more often based on local Pushtun communities justifying their struggle with the defense of Islam and the neighborhood. Guerrilla movements can be state-sponsored, ideologically derived, ethnicity-based, or created from local xenophobia or political or criminal opportunism.

A guerrilla force is usually not in uniform and blends with the local populace when not fighting. The guerrilla may be untrained or well trained, paid or unpaid, locally based or drawn from different regions or countries, armed with whatever is available or armed with the latest in weaponry. Some guerrilla forces are defeated tactically and quit. Others hang on despite repeated defeats. Factors that are common to resilient guerrilla forces are base camps/safe houses, redundant logistics, sanctuary, secure lines of communication, effective leadership, ethnicity, ideology/religion, geography, patience, recruitment, anonymity, and collective resolve.

Base Camps/Safe Houses

Base camps are normally areas that provide logistics, immediate medical care, and a staging area from which to mount ambushes, attacks, raids, and propaganda efforts. Safe houses are the urban equivalent. Base camps are usually located on difficult terrain with limited access routes and often double as forward logistics points for a larger area. Consequently, they are engineered for a stiff conventional fight and contain crew-served weapons, field fortifications, obstacles, and road blocks. Safe houses are not as robust and depend on the support or forbearance of the neighbors to survive. The base camp or safe house is usually the core of the local guerrilla resistance, and destruction of either often results in greatly reduced guerrilla activity until an alternate base camp is established. A base camp external to the urban area will often support several safe houses.

Redundant Logistics

Unless the area of the conflict is small, a guerrilla movement

will establish multiple logistics points so that the loss of one will not fatally cripple the movement. There may be a network of small caches, forward supply points, supply points, supply dumps, and even depots supporting the movement. The local availability of food and water will often determine the size of the facility, supporting transport required and area of operation. Secure logistics facilities can be quite large and perform maintenance and repair. Logistics points are usually co-located with base camps.

Sanctuary

A guerrilla force needs a safe area into which it can withdraw, especially if its base camp is overrun. There, the force can treat its wounded, rest, train, refit, recruit, plan and rebuild. Sanctuary areas are safe due to terrain (mountains, jungle), geographic location (across international borders), or location among a supportive population (Sadr City, the Pushtun tribal areas in Pakistan). Logistics facilities, medical care, veterinary care, training areas, and longer-term accommodations are often part of a sanctuary area. The presence of friendly civilians adds protection from air and artillery attack. A sanctuary area may contain a judicial facility, confinement facility, and other trappings of parallel governance. For the tactical leader, a base camp may be sanctuary, but the larger movement needs its own sanctuary. Exploratory peace talks may designate a specific geographic area for negotiations, providing an area of temporary sanctuary.⁴ External support for guerrillas is not essential for resiliency, but permitted/tolerated sanctuary in a neighboring country is a very desirable thing.

Secure Lines of Communication

All warfare, conventional or guerrilla, is about lines of communication. The opposing commanders are concerned with preserving their own lines of advance, retreat and supply and interdicting those enemy lines.⁵ Much of guerrilla tactics is “hit and run.” Run is at least as important as hit, and the successful guerrilla commander has planned and secured his run line well before he hits. On an operational scale, maintaining the lines of retreat to sanctuary is essential for the guerrilla leader (and sometimes the conventional commander, e.g., French Điện Biên Phủ in 1954 and the British retreat from Kabul in 1842).

Leadership

A good guerrilla leader is a good military leader. Leadership is of prime importance and vulnerable. Senior guerrilla leaders most often reside in sanctuary, leaving the second-tier leaders to run the base camps and conduct the tactical fight.⁶ Decapitation of the senior leadership does not always destroy a guerrilla movement, but it will certainly slow it down, particularly if the first and second tiers of guerrilla leadership are consistently eliminated. Charismatic leaders are the hardest to replace but are not always the best. Guerrilla staffs are essential for large movements, and their elimination can prove just as catastrophic to a guerrilla movement as the loss of a leader. Some guerrilla movements have an overall pyramidal structure with a single leader (Vietnam), where others have various

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competing guerrilla movements with different leaders (Afghanistan and Iraq). Decapitation is difficult in either case.

Ethnicity

Many guerrilla movements are based on ethnic identification and on perceived ethnic survival (the Chinese in the Malayan Insurgency, the Albanians in Kosovo, the Chechens). The dedicated ethnic guerrilla fights to preserve an identity, a way of life, and a heritage. Changing this loyalty or co-opting its adherents is a very tall order for psychological operations, land reform, or constitutional reform — traditional approaches to winning the population away from supporting the guerrilla.

Ideology/Religion

Marxism-Leninism did not die with the Soviet Union. Maoism stalks South Asia and the Pacific. Religion matters. Ideology and religion produce true believers who will gladly blow themselves and others up in the name of the greater good. Guerrilla movements based on ideological or religious convictions are hard to suppress. Like ethnicity, it is a matter of honor, loyalty, and deep-held belief.

Geography

It is tough to be a guerrilla on an open plain. It is much easier in the mountains, jungle, deep forest, wide river delta, or sympathetic neighborhood. These are also the areas in which it is hard for conventional forces to maneuver and where technology is less effective. However, the geography should not be so challenging that survival and finding food become the guerrillas' primary task.

Patience

Patience is more than a virtue. The resilient guerrilla needs to be willing to fight for the long term. Guerrilla warfare does not have to be protracted, but the resilient guerrilla movement must be capable of making it so if that is key to survival and success. Waiting out an opponent is an ancient guerrilla tactic that still works. The adage “you have the watches, but we have the time” is appropriate against an external occupation force that has no desire to remain indefinitely.

Recruitment

Guerrillas die, sicken, get hurt, grow old, or desert and have to be replaced. Successful guerrilla campaigns require ever-larger forces. The guerrilla leader must have sufficient charisma, and the ideological/religious/ethnic appeal or rewards system must be strong enough to attract a steady stream of recruits for the cause.

Anonymity

A guerrilla force is a secret society with its own rituals, special signs, and requirements. A well-placed informer can destroy the entire organization. Anonymity is particularly important during the initial phase of a guerrilla war. A resilient guerrilla force is one that vets and controls its membership and can hide in plain view.⁷

Collective Resolve

Some peoples are more pugnacious and jealous of their turf than others. They will fight just because an outsider is on their territory without their permission. This inherent cussedness explains why some nations accept outside occupation and domination with barely more than a muffled mutter of protest, while other peoples quickly organize themselves to drive the outsider away. Some folks are just naturally warlike while others would rather see if they can wait it out. This is not to say that national passive-aggressiveness will not work. Some peoples are just more disposed to squeezing triggers.

Conclusion

Successful guerrilla campaigns usually follow three phases. The guerrillas form, train, and bond during the first or incipient phase. The guerrilla campaign is most vulnerable during this phase, and concerted opposition can readily destroy the movement. The second phase is the attack phase, where the guerrilla force begins to contest turf with its rival. The tactics are hit and run. The guerrilla campaign is still very vulnerable during this phase, particularly during retreat to sanctuary. For the counter guerrilla force, the key to success is the ability to project sufficient power over distance and conduct a successful pursuit. For the resilient guerrilla, the key to success is securing lines of retreat to sanctuary. During the third phase, the guerrilla conducts attacks and retains territory. The guerrilla force is stronger and its vulnerability is often a function of overextension or refusal to abandon recently acquired chunks of territory. During the third phase, the resilient guerrilla force is able to reconstitute itself rapidly through recruiting, logistics strength, and leadership.

Guerrilla forces are like snowflakes in that no two are exactly alike. Resiliency among guerrilla forces is not quantifiable. However, the above factors keep appearing in the histories of guerrilla conflicts.⁸ Not all the factors are always present, but most of them are. Ultimately the process that seems to work in bringing resilient guerrillas to heel is to move against the guerrillas' families. Forced relocation of families and villages into

camp and government-controlled villages or other programs that threaten to destroy the core values and identity of a tribe or people seem to have the best results. These programs win no prizes for humanitarian principles, and sometimes backfire by forcing the guerrilla to fight to the bitter end.

Endnotes

¹ Ho Chi Minh, *Prison Diary* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962).

² Lester Grau, *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War* (Quantico: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998).

³ Some authors distinguish among insurgents (those who fight against their established government but do not have a legal belligerent status), partisans (light troops making raids and forays against any enemy, usually as guerrillas), and guerrillas (those who carry out irregular warfare as a member of an independent unit). Irregular warfare involves irregulars (non-soldiers) who do not conform to some or all rules of warfare, accepted tactics or military professionalism. None of these definitions are particularly precise, so for the purposes of this article the term "guerrilla" is used as a blanket designation, on the assumption that the reader will recognize one when he sees one.

⁴ Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to Basics*, Second Edition, (Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011) 352.

⁵ T. Miller Maguire, *Outlines of Military Geography* (London: C. J. Clay & Sons, 1899) 21-22.

⁶ Demarest, 238-239.

⁷ Ibid, 2-3.

⁸ A good start is the two volume set of Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1975).

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

NEWSLETTER No. 12-18:

UNDERSTANDING AFGHAN CULTURE

This newsletter contains a collection of previously published articles that focus on Afghan culture and provides insight into effectively communicating with Afghans in order to achieve positive results. More specifically, the articles contained in this newsletter highlight methods to initiate and improve relationships with Afghans, the difficulties and challenges leaders and Soldiers experienced in communicating with Afghans, what worked and did not work, and how to foster and improve meaningful relationships with Afghans to achieve the desired outcome. This newsletter can be accessed online at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp>.

SELF-AWARENESS: THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP

LTC MILFORD H. BEAGLE JR.

In his January 2012 Marching Orders titled “America’s Force of Decisive Action,” Army Chief of Staff GEN Raymond T. Odierno identified “adapting leader development” as one of his top priorities for today’s Soldiers. He also stated that he wants leader development “to meet our future security challenges in an increasingly uncertain and complex strategic environment.” Self-awareness establishes the critical foundation for this priority. This competency provides the single largest contribution to developing leaders. Leaders who understand the value of self-awareness can prevent downward spirals of personal and organizational ineffectiveness. However, the Army needs to develop robust and effective tools to achieve this competency.

FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, states that “self-awareness has the potential to help all leaders become better adjusted and more effective.” Additionally, the Army surmises that in order to operate in the current and future strategic environment, leaders are required to be adaptive and self-aware. According to FM 6-22, “to achieve leadership success in increasingly more complex tactical, operational, and strategic environments, leaders need to expand professional, domain knowledge and develop a keen sense of self-awareness.”

FM 6-22 defines self-awareness as “being aware of oneself, including one’s traits, feelings, and behaviors.” Self-awareness is not only about the individual leader, but the impact the leader has on others. However, the Army has been unable to leverage the full potential of self-awareness for every leader.

Leaders must employ reflection and feedback — two key enablers of success — to achieve self-awareness.

Rose A. Mueller-Hanson and colleagues posit the purpose of reflection is to “increase self-awareness and to help leaders think through their performance in situations requiring an adaptive response.”¹ This ability to “think through” is a self-critique of one’s strengths and weaknesses. Gareth Morgan wrote that “authentic [self-aware] leaders are willing to devote themselves to their own personal growth and development.”² Self-reflection offers leaders a way to evaluate the impact of their choices or decisions. They must be able to assess their own abilities, determine their strengths and weaknesses, and actively learn to overcome their weaknesses.


Self-reflection can be “as simple as posing questions about one’s own behavior, knowledge, or feelings,” according to FM 6-22. However, the manual fails to outline exactly what this means or how it is to be applied. The Army’s guidance would be more effective if self-reflection included asking questions relevant to personal performance and behavior as it relates to the

environment, set of circumstances, and/or others.

Feedback is the second critical factor for developing leaders who are self-aware. Leaders must use internal and external assessments. However, the Army’s current use of assessments is unreliable.

The Army currently utilizes formal counseling statements, 360-degree multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF), and periodic informal counseling as a means to gauge a leader’s effectiveness. The problem with the 360-degree method of review is that it allows leaders to personally select who provides their feedback. The participants can be either inside or outside of a leader’s current organization or a former superior, subordinate, or peer. This is counterproductive and helps reward poor leadership. Glowing reviews from “friends” can help promotion potential so that the mid and top tier of Army leadership reflects “back-scratching diplomacy” rather than effective assessments.

Dan Goleman and colleagues state that “feedback within an organization can be distorted in a way wherein leaders receive primarily filtered and mostly positive information from others on account of their position.”³ David A. Kenny suggests that “when people believe that their outcomes are determined by another person’s impression of them, they should be highly motivated to discern, monitor, and control that impression.”⁴ For this process to work, leaders must display the willingness to cope with impressions that are both favorable and unfavorable. As an important tool, we cannot solicit feedback only from those with similar views or based on biases due to the leader’s position.



<http://msaf.army.mil/LeadOn.aspx>

The multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) 360 is one of the methods the Army currently uses to assess its leaders.

According to Susan J. Ashford, leaders have three challenges in accessing feedback from others: the information problem (how to gather information from others within an organizational reality characterized by ambiguity, risk, conflicting cues, and randomness); the ego defense problem (how to obtain accurate information without negatively affecting the ego); and the self-presentation problem (how to obtain accurate information from others while appearing autonomous and self-confident).⁵ Leaders who admit areas of weakness provide a model within the organization that makes it acceptable to not have all the right answers, make mistakes, and seek assistance.

In addition to refined 360-degree assessments, leaders must be required to participate in opinion surveys. The design of the questions should closely reflect those of the 360 survey, but the opinion surveys must be initiated by the leader's supervisor. This approach provides equal leverage in soliciting feedback on leaders and as a way to validate or invalidate a leader's 360-degree assessment.

Competent people in positions of leadership create a self-reality of their own that is quite different from the reality shared by others.⁶ Therefore, leaders should provide a predictive assessment on how they think they will be viewed by others prior to soliciting a 360-degree assessment. This provides a comparative assessment of perception versus reality. According to Scott N. Taylor, "initial studies show that asking MSAF participants to anticipate how they are seen by others can be a strong predictor of performance."⁷

The Army should also adopt "pre-mortem" feedback as a useful way of facilitating leader self-awareness. This form of feedback can complement the standard after action review (AAR) process used by the Army. Developed by cognitive psychologist Gary Klein, the goal of "pre-mortem" is to work around some insensitivities of the AAR by focusing the team on potential points of failure versus blaming single individuals for past mistakes. By introducing the artificiality of events being deemed dismal failures prior to their execution, leaders must face blame versus avoiding it in order to preserve a self-image. Leaders are required to reflect on thoughts, decisions, and potential actions as a result of "pre-mortem." This reflection can help leaders realize areas of weakness in a non-threatening set of circumstances. This approach not only helps the individual but also the teams in which he or she leads. By using "pre-mortem," Klein observed that teams have been able to improve their performance based on this technique.⁸

FM 6-22 asserts that a lack of self-awareness may also obstruct learning and adaptability, which in turn keeps leaders from creating a positive work climate and a more effective organization. Toxic leadership is an emerging issue within the Army. In analyzing two years of Army survey data, John P. Steele discovered that "the vast majority of U.S. Army leaders observed a toxic leader in the last year, and over a third indicated

Competent people in positions of leadership create a self-reality of their own that is quite different from the reality shared by others. Therefore, leaders should provide a predictive assessment on how they think they will be viewed by others prior to soliciting a 360-degree assessment.

that they had firsthand experience with three or more toxic leaders, indicating significant prevalence."⁹ The Center for Army Leadership (CAL) report also reflects that a high number of participants (75 percent) agreed that their superior is a "real jerk," but there was also a high correlation to those willing to "emulate [their] immediate superior."

Thus, Soldiers do not believe leaders are held accountable for their poor leadership and, in fact, continue advancing in rank. The current methods of leadership review reinforce this vicious

cycle. This is why it is critical to adopt the recommendations above and immediately begin transforming how the U.S. Army helps leaders see themselves.

Notes

¹ Rose A. Mueller-Hanson, Susan S. White, David W. Dorsey, and Elaine D. Pulakos, "Training Adaptable Leaders: Lessons From Research and Practice," research report through Personnel Decisions Research Institutes, Inc. (2005).

² Gareth Morgan, "Reflective Practice and Self-Awareness," *Perspectives in Public Health* 129 (July 2009), 162.

³ Dan Goleman, Richard E. Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2002). As quoted in Scott N. Taylor's article "Redefining Leader Self-Awareness By Integrating The Second Component of Self-Awareness," *Journal Of Leadership Studies* (Winter 2010).

⁴ David A. Kenny, *Interpersonal Perception: A Social Relations Analysis* (New York: Guilford Press, 2002), 147.

⁵ Susan J. Ashford, "Self-Assessments in Organizations: A Literature Review and Integrative Model, Research in Organizational Behavior." As quoted in Taylor's article "Redefining Leader Self-Awareness..."

⁶ Sydney Finkelstein, *Why Smart Executives Fail: And What You Can Learn From Their Mistakes* (New York: Portfolio, 2004), 1-21.

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⁹ 2011 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), Center for Army Leadership (CAL) Technical Report.

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BUILDING A BETTER TRENCH

RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO DOCTRINE

MAJ STEPHEN J. TEGGE

While serving as an instructor for the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Ga., I studied history and read field manuals and numerous books on leadership, tactics, and psychology to prepare for various classes. Given the last decade of warfare and the doctrinal shifts carried with it, there seemed to be a recurring theme in military circles on the subject of insurgencies. By virtue of the fights in which we were engaged and given the history of post colonial warfare, it seemed that insurgency was always at the forefront of every conversation. The United States and other countries continually get involved in them. With minimal study of history, it becomes apparent that the reason for this is that the enemies we face are using the only strategy they can possibly employ to have any chance against us (or any other numerically/technologically superior enemy). The enemy has analyzed our most obvious weaknesses and naturally exploited them by drawing us into insurgencies. It's a proven tactic that continually works. The insurgents force us to fight at times and places of their choosing, thereby allowing them to dictate the tempo. We crave fast-paced maneuver, so they slow the tempo to their liking, rendering our greatest strength — tempo — in effect, useless. Wars, in general,

will become unpopular over time, so the insurgent's ability to slow the tempo provides the necessary elongation of time for political discord to grow in the invader's/occupier's homeland. This problem has confounded combatant commanders since the dawn of organized warfare.

We appear to be trying to continue to become better counterinsurgents instead of concentrating on a winning strategy. As I read field manuals, history, Sun Tzu and John Boyd, it became apparent to me that there may be inconsistencies in our intellectual and doctrinal approaches to warfare. It seems everybody is making the presumption that counterinsurgency (COIN) is the new standard of warfare. Based on that, we have codified our COIN doctrine in field manuals, and we continue to become better counterinsurgents. Despite the time, labor, and resource intensity of this style of fighting, we continue to approach it as the status quo of warfare. While I agree that we have made leaps and bounds in our understanding of the nature of COIN and how to conduct it, the insurgent still dictates the terms of the fight, and insurgency still remains the single best tactic the enemy has to the fight the U.S. and deplete its national will and resources. The insurgent's small, cheap innovations lead to billion dollar reactions by the U.S. and its allies. No matter what we do, our doctrine and equipment procurement always seem to be a reaction to enemy action instead

*Soldiers with the 1st Brigade Combat Team,
82nd Airborne Division conduct a patrol in
Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, on 19 May 2012.*

Photo by SGT Michael J. MacLeod





Photo courtesy of German Federal Archives

After WWI, German leaders were forced to rethink how they fought. The solution was blitzkrieg (lightning war), which used speed, surprise, and combined arms operations.

of innovation that drives the enemy's decisions.

As I thought about insurgency, I began to seek a way to defeat it or at least reduce it to a footnote of how we conduct war. To put the problem into context, I needed to view it through the lens of an analogy from the past. Much of the research I had been doing at the time had been centered on the *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* by William S. Lind and the other books mentioned in this article. Many of the examples Lind used came from the German experience in World War II. The Germans and their approach to tactical problem solving became the analogy that I settled on to illustrate the problem. The Germans faced what was essentially a huge trench line, a throwback to the previous war. To fight the French along that trench line would give the French the ability to dictate the terrain and tempo of the fight. This would deplete vast amounts of German resources and most certainly lead to their defeat. They could not afford to simply "build a better trench" and slug it out for another slaughter on the scale of World War I. They had to think beyond the problem; they would need doctrine that worked around (or stepped over) the strengths of the prevailing way of thinking about warfare.

Blitzkrieg (Lightning War), 1940

Germany had its eyes on conquering all of Europe in 1940. After securing many of its early objectives, Germany was still left with the Maginot Line and how to deal with it. This monument to the allied victory in WWI presented a problem for the ever more aggressive Germany. They trained mentally and physically for the attack on France, applying lessons learned from WWI (by the end, they were having some success tactically) and their recent fighting in Poland.

One of the key pieces of the defense network along the border of France and the Low Countries was the "impenetrable" fortress of Eben Emael in Belgium — a massive concrete complex of interlocking fields of fire, minefields, and pre-sighted artillery. To approach the fortress in a frontal attack in the manner of the previous war would be tactical suicide. Therefore, the Germans approached the problem from a different angle. With a single, very bold, and imaginative glider attack, they captured the fortress against terribly lopsided odds by simply landing silently on top of

it with specially trained troops armed with shaped charges and special equipment. In a very short time, a small special operations unit neutralized the threat of Eben Emael, securing a very efficient victory. After that, the German army penetrated through the Low Countries and drove right past the Maginot Line. They went straight to all the places no one expected them to go, concentrating strength against weakness and moving at relentless speed — using modern technology to compound their capabilities. Within weeks, trench warfare as a strategy had been relegated to the scrap heap of history. This exact same thing has happened endlessly throughout the evolution of warfare. The feudal system ended the terror of the Viking raids; long bows ended the reign of knights; artillery and rifled guns ended the grand maneuvers of the Napoleonic period, and so on. The key was, and still is, to find a way — through superior tactics and better use of equipment — to destroy the viability of the enemy's tactics and equipment, not just fight the fight better.

German leaders, by virtue of losing WWI, were forced to rethink how they fought. They looked at what worked for the enemy and thought past it, thereby redefining warfare. This style of fighting was so revolutionary and effective that we still use the fundamentals of German WWII doctrine in our doctrine today. FM 6-0 is titled *Mission Command*, which has its root in *Auftragstaktik* — the style of planning and execution that the Germans employed. We focus on a decisive point, and we train for rapid maneuver and massed firepower on enemy weakness.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, states the following in reference to lethal operations: "In these operations, speed, surprise, and shock (emphasis added) are vital considerations. Historically, the side better able to combine them defeats its opponent rapidly while incurring fewer losses. Such victories create opportunities for an exploitation. In some operations, the effects of speed, surprise, and shock are enough to collapse organized resistance. Such a collapse occurred in the offensive phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003." This passage describes blitzkrieg perfectly.

It is common knowledge that Germany lost the war, but their contribution to warfare is undeniable.

Insurgency as the Answer to Blitzkrieg

Just as blitzkrieg was the answer to trench warfare, insurgency has become the answer to the blitzkrieg-style of warfare. It serves to drag the conventional Army into unfavorable terrain and slow it down, preventing the decisive victories necessary to overall victory in a maneuver conflict. It is the opposite of maneuver — or, arguably, the ultimate form of it. As our history illustrates, U.S. citizens don't have the patience or political will to fight COIN through to success, and our Army is still not designed for this kind of fight (and I would argue that it shouldn't be). Therefore, despite lessons learned in Vietnam, we have stepped back into this kind of fight and set about relearning it again at the cost of over a trillion dollars. This is exactly how our enemies want it — they want us to spend excessively and overreact to their actions because this buys them more time and political leverage.

If any country we invade/occupy has done its homework, it knows that once the maneuver part is over, all it has to do is become loosely organized and begin conducting a guerilla campaign. If the fighting continues long enough, eventually the

indigenous populace will (regardless of our noble intent) tire of Americans roaming their cities. Eventually, the government and people of the U.S. will start to squabble over the nature and purpose of the conflict. It seems that we have reached a similar type of tactical impasse as that of the Germans after World War I. Much as the Germans couldn't afford another trench war, we most likely will not be able to afford another insurgency in the near future (financially, politically, or culturally) after Iraq and Afghanistan, whether history deems us successful or not in those regions. However, this will not prevent future enemies from attempting to drag us into insurgencies. Therefore, the problem that continues to nag me is that, as of yet, no one has been able to find a way to do anything other than counter the insurgency, not render it useless — making it still the most viable tactic against us.

Flash Foresight meets FM 5-0

In his book *Flash Foresight*, Daniel Burrus directs the reader to “take your biggest problem and skip it.” The premise of this is to get the reader to stop staring directly at the most apparent problem facing him. If one focuses on an obvious problem, it begins to loom larger and more complex than it actually needs to be. For instance, had the Germans decided they were going to fight the French with trench warfare in World War II, it would have been an insurmountable task, and they could have never built up the resources, political capital, and manpower to undertake it successfully. Therefore, they used the premise that Burrus advocates and skipped over trench warfare to reshape the future in a manner more conducive to their style of fighting.

Almost as if pulled from the pages of Burrus' book, in Chapter 3 of FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, we are instructed to reframe a troublesome problem in a different context in order to “solve the right problem.” Personally, I am not certain that our approach to COIN is solving the right problem. If it were, I don't think insurgency would still be such an effective tactic. We have certainly learned all the fundamentals of fighting this type of conflict and codified them well. We have become well-trained, experienced COIN fighters with solid doctrine, but I think we would be better served to try to redefine, not try to predict, how future wars are fought instead of just understanding how the last war was fought. Perhaps our doctrine should not follow us but instead carry us forward, while incorporating the experiences of the past, distilling them, and placing them forward in time (in an entirely new way) from where we currently stand. Doctrine should not become merely the droppings of our experiences that can be picked up by future generations; these droppings should instead be distilled and synthesized into a doctrine that pulls us forward rather than anchors us to the past. According to COL John Boyd, “...it's doctrine on day one, and every day after that it becomes dogma,” and dogma limits our options and ability to see a problem clearly enough to adequately solve it.¹ It forms the box inside which we tend to think from that day forward.

In *Think and Grow Rich*, Napoleon Hill differentiates between two types of imagination. He refers to them as “synthetic” and “creative” imagination. Synthetic imagination “...creates nothing. It merely works with the material of experience, education, and observation with which it is fed.” On the other hand, creative imagination is defined as the “... faculty (through which) all basic

Perhaps our doctrine should not follow us but instead carry us forward, while incorporating the experiences of the past, distilling them, and placing them forward in time (in an entirely new way) from where we currently stand.

or new ideas are handed over to man.” I would argue that we need an Army that leverages more creative thinking. This would drive the synthetic thinking of our adversaries.

A Gross Violation

This article is somewhat of a violation of the unwritten code we in the military live by. We are told from the day we set foot

in this Army that if you're going to complain, you better provide a solution or just keep your mouth shut. Sadly, I don't have that solution — or even an attempt at one. However, given that there are no solutions provided, this also prevents factors from limiting the argument. In 1978, there was a briefing that circulated around the Pentagon known as the “Spinney Report,” which gave several critiques of the Pentagon without providing solutions. In his book *Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War*, Robert Coram wrote that this was intentional because Spinney feared that a list of recommendations would become a list of chores that would go out to specific agencies. He wrote that Spinney was “tearing the domain apart and creating the destructive deduction.”² My critique here is by no means a Spinney Report, but the point is the same. If recommendations were provided, the argument would shift to the validity of the recommendations instead of the validity of the original problem statement. The lack of recommendations opens the field to a far broader spectrum of discussion and creativity.

In conclusion, I am merely writing this to get people to think about the future of warfare and how we might be able to reshape it and mold it to our strengths. I want people to think about how we are approaching every aspect of our doctrine, training, military education, and procurement. Are we solving the right problems? Are we focusing solely on doing old things better? Or ... are we proactively creating a future that plays to our strengths? We must let the insurgents of the world continue to “fight the last war” while we create a new future of warfare. Therefore, consider this a problem statement, with the request that we think about warfare differently as we head into a future of budget cuts and potentially reduced intervention abroad.

Notes

¹ Daniel Ford, *A Vision So Noble: John Boyd, the OODA Loop, and America's War on Terror* (Durham, NH: Warbird Books, 2010).

² “Destructive Deduction” — According to Robert Coram, John Boyd used this term to describe the act of destroying all the interrelationships between parts and wholes creating a “sea of anarchy” and then moving to construct order out of the mess. This is not just “thinking outside the box,” but destroying the box as well, because the box itself creates limitations.

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MISSSED OPPORTUNITIES:

CULTURAL AWARENESS IS CRITICAL DURING CRISES

LTC DAVID OCLANDER

The fallout from the recent events surrounding the Koran burning and subsequent murder of 16 villagers by a U.S. Soldier may have pushed the mission in Afghanistan to a strategic tipping point. Given the current conditions, only the most courageous leadership at every level will recover the legitimacy of NATO and the United States that is critical to accomplishing the mission. I suggest basic lessons in cultural leadership can propel leaders to take their critical place during this crisis. The absence of such will create a void that will lead to missed opportunities and, ultimately, to mission failure.

In 2010, I was responsible for the accidental death of two little girls in a remote village in southern Afghanistan. The events occurred in a village that sat in the middle of a critical valley that the Afghan army and my Infantry battalion from the 82nd Airborne Division had just fought very hard to gain control of. During a night patrol, my company commander fired an infrared illumination round because there was a report of potential enemy activity. The canister that released the parachute flare was blown off course due to unexpected high-altitude crosswinds. The canister crashed through the roof of a house and landed squarely in the middle of the bed where the two little girls were sleeping. The round crushed both girls and slightly wounded their mother.

When I learned of the incident, my Afghan army counterpart — a former Mujahedeen commander — recommended that we immediately go to the site and hold a shura (meeting with the elders) to discuss the situation and seek forgiveness. His point was this could not be done through an apology or showing up with reparations money. He suggested that we look the victims in the face, treat them with honor, and ask for grace because we were only humans and the situation was only an accident.

When we arrived, I was amazed at the number of Afghan men who had come to the shura. Most of them wanted a way to make sense of the incident. There were also a number of senior mullahs who had come to the shura. The mullahs were an audience we always had problems engaging. I think they were there because there was an understanding that they would make an announcement that they were going to “hand the valley back to the Taliban.” This would have made sense to the villagers in the audience who were looking for justice.

In America, our decision making — deliberate and reactive — emanates from our Judeo-Christian culture. Likewise, the Afghan culture is driven by the cultural context of Pashtunwali.

Too often in Afghanistan, we offer an apology or monetary reparations and expect the incident to be over and forgotten. This makes sense in our Judeo-Christian culture but does not begin to pass the test to an Afghan. Neither an apology nor money satisfies an Afghan's need for honor or justice. Instead, there is a clearly defined process to gain forgiveness. An Afghan is obligated by Pashtunwali to extend forgiveness and hospitality if the right steps are taken. Likewise, an Afghan is obligated to seek forgiveness if he wrongs another.

Pashtunwali is generally defined by three concepts: honor, revenge (or justice), and hospitality (or asylum). When we make decisions regarding situations in Afghanistan (tactical or strategic) and leaders do not account for this context, they are setting the mission up for failure.

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When we sat down at the shura and discussed the incident, the Afghan provincial governor, army commander, and police commander took the lead. What became apparent was that the villagers did not have a problem with the Afghan government representatives; they had a problem with the Americans because it was our round that killed the girls so I asked to speak at the negotiations. I sat in front of the senior mullah and asked that the bloodshed stop with me since I was the responsible American commander. I offered the mullah a knife I carried and asked him to take my blood rather than allow the incident to continue the previous violence in the valley. I promised him the deaths were an accident, and I told him that I was the only one that should be held accountable for the accident.

I never feared this offer would be accepted because of the lessons my Afghan mentors had taught me about Pashtunwali. The mullah accepted the gesture and told me I could put away the knife. I later asked for forgiveness and promised to honor the family. Several weeks later after the exchange of a small food delivery for the funeral celebration, and with violence still almost nonexistent in this valley, we met with the father of the family. At the meeting, we offered an appropriate condolence that was negotiated by an interlocutor along with a direct apology and request for forgiveness. The father accepted the apology and extended his forgiveness.

The lessons that should be learned extend beyond this specific example. To move forward and achieve the expressed goals in Afghanistan, NATO (especially American leaders) must better

understand the basic culture and customs of the Afghans. Most important to America is that the lessons of this example can be reversed when America needs to hold our Afghan partners accountable for their failures. The fundamental but missed opportunity of “partnership” was always mutual accountability.

Furthermore, Westerners cannot be afraid to discuss Islam with Muslims. There are more opportunities for common ground and common good than divisiveness if we talk about the importance of sharing values that drive our actions than if we require moral neutrality. When dialog about religion is restricted, it concedes the issue (which defines the existence of the common villager and his relationship with the government) to the Taliban. An intelligent enemy, the Taliban will exploit this exposed vulnerability. Finally, the only long-term solution in Afghanistan is education. Only

when common Afghans can read their own religious doctrine (that is typically only allowed to be written in Arabic) will they stop listening to the uninformed minority that expresses extremist ideology. This will not only end the cycle of violence but also open the door for long-term opportunity. Taking these steps requires courageous decisions at every level of leadership. At this decisive point in the campaign, enlightened leadership embracing these steps has never been more relevant.


LTC David Oclander is a former commander of the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, which deployed to Afghanistan and was under Regional Command - South (Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan Provinces). He is currently serving on the Joint Staff, Joint Operations Division.



Photo by SSG Bradley Lail

LTC David Oclander briefs GEN David H. Petraeus, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, at a checkpoint on 9 July 2010 in Kandahar, Afghanistan. At the time, LTC Oclander was serving as commander of the 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

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MOTORCYCLES IN THE

A DOCTRINAL APPROACH TO ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL SUCCESS

CPT KYLE STOCKWELL

"Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions."

— Sun Tzu

Throughout history, armies that gained superior mobility at the tactical level proved successful. The ability to forward-deploy ground forces deep behind the enemy's front line and saturate the battlefield has had profound psychological effects on the enemy. Superior mobility facilitated tactical success on the battlefield and ultimately laid the foundation for victory at the operational level. Since the advent of machines, motorcycles have been employed across the world on battlefields to enhance mobility. However, when faced with an unconventional threat, the U.S. military strayed away from light tactical mobility and adopted heavier, slower, and less maneuverable vehicles; they traded mobility for a defensive capability and mind-set. These vehicles not only increased the overall risk of mounted operations but also willingly gave the enemy an advantage of mobility over U.S. ground forces.

The solution to unconventional warfare is not to build larger vehicles to withstand blasts but to be quicker and more agile than the enemy. Conventional units need to have a light tactical mobility asset that can be quickly employed as a part of a combined arms team. Motorcycles should return to conventional forces as that asset. Without being able to match or exceed the adversary's mobility, conventional forces are in danger of being predictable and consequently incapable of significantly affecting the adversary's decision-making cycle. Motorcycles applied within the current operating environment (COE) will allow conventional forces to affect the adversary both at the tactical and operational levels.

By employing motorcycle formations, conventional units will be able to meet the adversary's mobility capabilities. Lacking superior mobility, the enemy will have to reevaluate how, and with what, they can initiate contact. Forcing the enemy to reorient and adjust to a constantly changing battlefield will begin to create gaps, both physically and psychologically, which can be exploited. U.S. conventional forces must incorporate sustainable light mobility that enables them to move faster and farther than the enemy.¹ When working in concert with heavier armor and aviation assets, motorcycles will be able to provide a holistic combined arms solution to solve the root of the issue: a lack of mobility.

Situation

Currently, U.S. conventional forces do not have superior mobility in their COE. In the last 10 years of conflict, conventional forces have gone from a six-foot tall, 7,700-pound utility vehicle to almost nine-foot-tall armored vehicles weighing 32,500-45,000 pounds. The increase in weight and height not only limits how they can employ mounted assets but also provides a gap in mobility that the enemy can exploit. As



CONVENTIONAL MILITARY



the U.S. military becomes heavier and slower, its adversaries continue to achieve tactical and operational success using enhanced mobility to outmaneuver lumbering armored vehicles and more easily interact with the local population. Even Soldiers in World War I understood that until superiority in mobility is gained in mechanized warfare, offensive power is of secondary value.² U.S. forces must once again strive to gain equal or greater tactical mobility.

History

The use of motorcycles in conventional forces is not new. To gain mobility in World War I, both horses and motorcycles were used to develop or shape the environment in order to increase the effectiveness of infantry or armor attacks. World War II is regarded as the first major conflict in which the machine was used as the primary means of mobility.³ Seeking more reliable and sustainable mobility, the German army replaced the horse with a motorcycle. The German army focused on integrating offensive mobility, speed, and precise flexible firepower with maneuver.⁴ Motorcycle teams, in support of larger mechanized or armor forces, swarmed the battlefield seeking to exploit any gap found in the enemy's defense. The German forces used the excellent cross-country mobility of motorcycles to find and confuse an enemy who was primarily oriented on roadways. Motorcycles made initial contact, and heavier units would provide additional firepower as they entered the engagement.⁵ Witnessing the effective employment of German motorcycle formations against conventional forces, the Russian army also employed motorcycles deep behind enemy lines with great success.⁶ The success of light tactical mobility continued to manifest itself against larger, armored forces in the 1987 Chad-Libyan war and the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war. The outcome was due, in large part, to the ability for highly mobile units to strike less mobile units repeatedly without suffering significant losses. The same fate of Libya/Israel could await U.S. forces in Afghanistan if immediate changes are not made to the lack of tactical mobility.

The United States was so impressed with the tactical application of motorcycles during World



Harris & Ewing, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division

U.S. Army Soldiers travel via motorcycle and side car in 1917.

War II it recommended issuing them to several types of units.⁷ In 1969, elements of air cavalry, armor, mechanized Infantry, reconnaissance, and Military Police units received motorcycles. Unfortunately, unlike their German predecessors, the U.S. Army made a few critical errors. The Army failed to build a motorcycle designed specifically for the off-road demands of military use. During the implementation phase, the Army failed to issue comprehensive training and maintenance plans designed to enhance the motorcycle's capabilities. In fact, a tactical training program wasn't codified until three years after the program began.⁸ The lack of tactical training, the absence of a motorcycle designed for off-road use, and minimal maintenance plans led to the degradation and ultimately the failure of motorcycles within those formations. Motorcycles continued to augment conventional unit mobility in a reduced capacity until 1993 when budget cuts following Operation Desert Storm downsized and eliminated motorcycles entirely. Although the U.S. Army has removed motorcycles from its inventory, the Marine Corps continues to list them in their light armored reconnaissance units, allowing the flexibility to enhance mobility if needed.⁹ As history has shown, the U.S. military has always strived to gain superior mobility over our adversary, and this endeavor is captured in U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine.

Doctrine

As a fundamental tenant, both U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine seek to gain greater mobility than their adversary. FM 3-21.20, *The Infantry Battalion*, clearly states that the lack of rapid mobility is an issue. Another fundamental tenant of offensive operations is surprise: striking the enemy in a time, place, or manner in which he is unprepared.



ARMOR, September-October 1982

Soldiers exit a helicopter by motorcycle.

The motorcycle is the vehicle that is able to strike in such a manner. The new Marine Corps/Army counterinsurgency manual also emphasizes the necessity for mobility in their doctrine. According to FM 2-24/Marine Corps WP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, "U.S. forces must lighten their combat loads and enforce a habit of speed and mobility. Otherwise, insurgents consistently outrun and outmaneuver them."

The Marine Corps continues to identify the shortfall of tactical mobility and commits to fixing it for future conflicts. Illustrating the necessity for light mobility, the Commandant of the Marine Corps states in his vision for 2025, "The MAGTF's (Marine Air Ground Task Force's) effectiveness in complex terrain must be qualitatively improved. This requires enhanced small unit training and situational awareness, and the reduction of gaps in ground tactical mobility."

Both services understand the need for their ground forces to increase situational awareness, connect with the people, and be able to rapidly gain and maintain contact with the enemy. U.S. conventional forces cannot do this by increasing the size and weight of our vehicles; we must instead get lighter. Employing the motorcycle to gain an edge in tactical mobility is both doctrinally sound as well as operationally relevant. Simply having the ability to move faster than your enemy has a deep psychological effect on him.

Application

Adding equal or superior mobility in any conflict has severe effects at the tactical and operational levels. There is an inherent psychological dominance that cavalry holds over Infantry due to their mobility.¹⁰ In World War I, the Russians likened the

The continual and repetitive use of motorcycles resulted in overwhelming tactical successes. The loss of momentum by the enemy and perceived omnipresence of the coalition forces at the tactical level eventually led to key operational victories.

motorcycle strike to that of a cavalry charge highlighting bold, short thrusts with a skillful combination of fire and rapid maneuver.¹¹

Motorcycles can be easily implemented into the conventional force today in several ways that could save lives and promote tactical mobility. Motorcycles used for tactical mobility affect the enemy psychologically and will promote operational maneuver across time and space. During Operation Enduring Freedom IX-X in Regional Command-West, motorcycles were used to great effect


in two very different types of maneuver. Regardless of how the motorcycles were employed though, their very presence on the battlefield struck fear into the enemy and had cascading positive effects for coalition forces.

The first type of maneuver utilized the motorcycles as a screening force for the main body. In this capacity they were allowed to move freely along the periphery (side, front, rear) of the main force. Much like the motorcycles of World War II, these units operated as a self-synchronizing network in which formations coordinated with each other horizontally and navigated through the battlefield without going through a central command.¹² These screening forces could deploy up to eight kilometers away from the main body and were able to be inserted via helicopter. This "swarming" mentality of the motorcyclists and their tactical mobility allowed them to adjust to a constantly changing battlefield and prevented the enemy from finding a suitable gap in the security to exploit.

Motorcycles were also used during route reconnaissance/route clearance for the main body. In this capacity, the motorcycles had organic security personnel and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)-certified personnel with the motorcycle force. The low signature of the motorcycle allowed it to infiltrate villages and liaise with citizens to gain real-time intelligence about improvised explosive device (IED) locations. Civilians were more apt to give information to a small motorcycle team rather than a column of armored American vehicles stopped on the main road. Greater mobility, enhanced intelligence capabilities, and the overall light weight of the motorcycle facilitated a more rapid clearing of IEDs. The continual and repetitive use of motorcycles resulted in overwhelming tactical successes. The loss of momentum by the enemy and perceived omnipresence of the coalition forces at the tactical level eventually led to key operational victories.

Counterpoint

Those who resist enhancing ground tactical mobility will highlight several issues as to why it would not be prudent to implement motorcycles into conventional units. The first argument is that motorcycles are not technically sound, a point largely based on the hasty and shortsighted fielding of the first motorcycle for Army use. Motorcycles were initially brought into U.S. military service as an emergency fix for a lack of mobility. With no time for serious product development, the Army tried to adapt civilian-model motorcycles to military use. The civilian machines



ARMOR, September-October 1982

Soldiers prepare for motorcycle training.



Afghan police practice motorcycle safety at Patrol Base Jaker, Afghanistan, on 9 April 2011.

Photo by Sgt. Earnest Barnes, USMC

simply could not keep pace with the rigors of military use, so motorcycles were given rear security tasks.¹³ Conversely, during World War II the German Army introduced a motorcycle designed specifically for military use and saw a nearly 700-percent increase of motorcycle battalions in its conventional forces.¹⁴ The German Army used motorcycles as an offensive weapon. As technology increased over time the U.S. Army decided to reevaluate motorcycles and in 1972 recommended they be issued to conventional units.¹⁵ Motorcycle technology today is deemed so reliable that elements of the 82nd Airborne Division are preparing to employ motorcycles in Afghanistan.¹⁶

A second argument is that riding motorcycles is dangerous and that the common Soldier does not know how to ride. Like any skill in the military, one is expected to repeat the process successfully until a fundamental knowledge of the piece of equipment has been achieved by conducting tough, realistic, standards-based, performance-orientated training. Even if the common Soldier is not considered an expert rider, technology today can compensate for the difference. An American manufacturer, Christini AWD Motorcycles, has developed two-wheel drive technology that enhances the abilities of an experienced rider or provides additional safety for the novice rider.¹⁷ Although riding a motorcycle can be difficult, the U.S. military is able to produce proficient riders through a tactical operators course rooted in outcome based training.

Recommendations

Adding motorcycles to the conventional Army would enable it to regain an equal level of tactical mobility respective to their adversary. Motorcycles will not only enable U.S. troops to achieve tactical success but also profound operational success as well. Using history and current conventional force doctrine as a guide, U.S. forces must demand a platform capable of delivering them to the cutting edge of battle as quickly as their adversary. With advances in technology, comprehensive tactical riding programs and a history rich in success, it is time the motorcycle returns to everyday conventional force use.

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THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATIONS IN THE CLASSROOM

LTC (RETIRED) GEORGE HODGE

Having read the article “A Battle in Every Classroom” by LTC Chuck Allen and Dr. James Sterrett in the January-March edition of *INFANTRY*, I could not pass up the opportunity to tell the rest of the story about the use of simulations in the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. The article does a great job of explaining the utility of low-overhead simulations in the classroom and many of the success stories that are emerging.

As a former Command and General Staff College (CGSC) tactics instructor from the early 1990s, I can attest to the accuracy of their statements about the high overhead and underutilization of the officers in the early *Prairie Warrior* exercises. Very few Soldiers in the training audience got any real training out of the collective effort. Little did I realize I would return to the scene of the crime years later and become one of “them” — an instructor responsible for developing and executing classroom simulation exercises. Fortunately, this time I was teamed up with some older, wiser, and more astute instructors that understood experiential learning and how when properly used, simulations could achieve learning that paper tactical decision games (TDGs) did not. I soon discovered there is an art and science to effectively using simulations in the classroom.

The Science Part

It All Boils Down to Money and Choices. The “science” of simulations is rather easy to determine but quite often the most difficult to resource. The science primarily involves the hardware, software, display screens, room configuration, and any other support such as communications and technical support personnel.

Hardware normally describes the computers necessary to run the program while software describes the operating system and actual simulation program. The display screens can range from the computer’s normal video monitor to a wide-screen wall mount that is adequately visible to a larger audience.

With the advance of technologies today, many of the constructive simulations are Windows-based and can run on the average laptop computer. The big advantage to this is that it normally makes the room easily configurable to whatever arrangement best achieves



Photos courtesy of author

Students replicate a division current operations cell. The simulation is used to drive the scenario. The situational awareness is transferred to the battle command system for display to the staff sections.

the learning objectives. Quite often in these exercises there are people who must be dislocated from one another (red from blue, adjacent units, subordinates from their higher headquarters) but need to be within close range of the exercise control cell. This is quite often resolved with adjacent room assignments.

The communications necessary to support this often involve little more than a single or multi-channel headset and a chat room, both of which are relatively affordable and easy to obtain. Lastly, some of the simulations do require a technical representative on site due to the operating system requirements or the possibility of programming or networking faults. The biggest issue with the science part is normally the funding for all the components or room size and configuration, or both. Without all the pieces or an adequate layout, the event may not have its optimal effect on the audience.

The bottom line to the science part is making decisions on how much hardware you need, the type of software, and the layout and configuration of the classroom, which are all pretty much driven by fiscal availability.

The Art Part

The “art” of employing constructive simulations is actually more challenging than most instructors realize. I’ve included some of my “Golden Rules and Best Practices” to help smooth the process of employing simulations in the classroom. I have found that following these tips and techniques increases the likelihood of having a successful outcome with the audience.

Define the target audience and the level of command. This is the first step. While this may seem like an obvious step, quite often we let the “cart drive the horse” with simulations. We often select a simulation we are comfortable with and make it “fit” the target audience. The target audience is usually defined as a level of command, such as a division, brigade combat team (BCT), battalion, etc. The next step is to clearly define the target audience within the level of command, such as the division current operations cell or a battalion commander. Keeping that in mind, we would then select a simulation that will allow us to drive information appropriate to the target audience. For example, if the target audience is a battalion commander, he should receive information consistent with what a battalion staff would provide him. In this case, we try to keep the commander in his role as commander and not force him to process all the raw data from the simulation and turn it into processed information that he would receive from his S2, S3, S4, etc. If the simulation does not provide this type of processed information, then the instructor will have to role-play the necessary staff functions. On the other hand, if the training audience is a staff section supporting the commander, then the simulation can be used to drive information for the staff that then allows them to process the information for the commander.

Call the experts. At the CGSC, we are fortunate to have a dedicated team to assist the instructional departments with all the necessary expertise to set up a constructive exercise. The Digital Leader’s Development Center Simulations Support Team has the requisite expertise to help instructors with all the hardware, software, network, communications, and technical support needed. The best idea is to go talk with the team about the exercise learning objectives that you are trying to achieve such as synchronizing the warfighting functions in an offensive combined arms maneuver scenario or practicing the rapid decision-making and synchronization process at the BCT level in a stability environment. They will offer suggestions in exercise design and recommend the most appropriate simulation and configuration. This meeting should take place several weeks in advance in order to ensure the simulation has the correct database installed and is “test-fired” to ensure that it does what you want it to do. We recommend running the scenario multiple times with different players ahead of time to see if you get the expected outcomes. This allows you to make modifications to the scenario in order to increase the likelihood of achieving the intended outcome. The simulation support team can often make these changes very quickly.


Simulations are either “turn-based” or “continuous-run.” Both have advantages. Turn-based simulations allow for natural break points (the end of a turn). This serves as a built-in pause for the instructor to check on learning and keeps the simulation running at the pace of the group (during the “crawl-walk” phase of the learning). Continuous-run simulations are often well suited for the evaluation (“run”) phase of the learning. Here, the players are forced to continue through the operations process without a pause unless the instructor determines a pause is necessary.

Do some expectation management up front. A good way to start off introducing a simulation is to ask the training audience to define the training environments, as described in FM 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*. Normally only a fraction of the audience

will be able to correctly identify and describe the environments of live-virtual-constructive. Few (if any) people in the audience will be able to correctly distinguish between the skills exercised in the virtual versus constructive environments. Many service members today have seen or played “first-person shooter” games (virtual) and used that experience as their frame of reference for what to expect in a constructive simulation — that the “game” should replicate actions and effects on the battlefield. This quite often produces a skewed set of expectations that the constructive simulation is “modeled” to replicate actual weapons systems and their effects. Let me give a personal example. As someone whose background is in the Army aviation community and spent my fair share of time in the various aircraft simulators, I had a difficult time making the leap from what simulators (virtual) trained (primarily kinesthetic skills, eg, tactile drills), to what simulations (constructive) trained (primarily cognitive skills, eg, thinking drills). I expected aviation units in a constructive simulation to employ aircraft survivability systems such as flares and chaff whenever they came into a high air defense threat area. It was easy for me to go back into the “first-person shooter” mentality and lose sight of the bigger picture of setting the conditions for the employment of the aviation battalion. In effect, I found myself fighting the attack helicopter instead of the attack battalion.

After explaining the different skills that are exercised in each, I tell the training audience to think of the upcoming constructive simulation as a type of chess game with military graphic unit interface. I also find it necessary to remind them that simulations are less than perfect and will sometimes display information that falls outside the norms of a battlefield environment. In that case the instructor needs to be ready to step in and perform a “white cell workaround” in order to get to the learning objective. Since there is no one simulation that “fits all,” we have to determine the target audience then go find the most appropriate simulation. One trap you might fall into is getting wedded to a particular simulation because there might be a better one out there.

Make pre-training successful. Expect to have to do some training with the audience prior to the learning activity. Usually



A student commander (standing, center) briefs his “subordinate” commander prior to the start of a decision-making exercise in Intermediate Level Education. A third student (far right) serves as an observer/recorder while a senior tactics instructor (far left) oversees the exercise.

there is a steep learning curve at the beginning of learning how to operate a simulation. Despite the growth and comfortableness of the video-game generation with computers, they still need to learn the particulars of the simulation. My experience with this generation is that they are quick learners and comfortable with the keyboard functions, displays, and communications, but they still struggle with arranging all their units and actions in such a way as to get the optimal effect on the target. The biggest challenge is getting them to a level of comfort with the simulation before the exercise begins. The balancing act is if you take too much time with the pre-learning activity, then you are likely wasting precious class time. On the other hand, if they do not get enough practice, then they struggle to operate the simulation and will miss the intent of the cognitive learning lesson. When I introduce a simulation to each new class, I have everyone follow along at their individual workstations while the primary instructor demonstrates up on the large screen in the front of the room. I always try to have at least one assistant instructor available that can walk around and help those that are stuck on a previous step or are having a hard time keeping up. I also try to NEVER EVER grab the person's mouse controller to show them something. I use an "analog" (old fashioned stick style) pointer and point to the various areas on the keyboard or screen and have THEM perform the steps. (I mention the analog pointer specifically because laser pointers WILL reflect off glass display screens.)

It has been my experience that the best you can get out of pre-training is a maximum of three hours in a day before students are at information overload. At the end of the session, I hand out a task list of the actions (such as plotting movement routes, marking targets for indirect fire, employing obstacles...) that they will likely use over and over. This is intended to be a ready-reference they can keep by their workstation and refer to should they not be able to recall some of the sub-steps initially. The idea behind this is to help them get thru as many repetitions of the most common tasks so that those tasks will become muscle memory by the time the actual simulation begins. Repetition matters. The more practice the students get, the better they will perform. At the next training session, I start off with a short review of the most common tasks and then have them execute those tasks using a short, pre-made scenario.

There appears to be about a 3:1 train-up time commitment for the instructor. For every hour of training, the instructor should expect to dedicate about three hours to preparation. This accounts for the instructor practicing the simulation, as well as developing some skill proficiency, basic troubleshooting skills, and coaching of the players in the use of the simulation. As precious as time is for instructors to prepare for class, a three-hour simulation exercise adds approximately nine more hours to the instructor's plate. This is one of the main reasons some instructors are reluctant to embrace the use of simulations in the classroom.

All the events built into the scenario should lead up to creating the conditions for the target audience to achieve the learning objective. If the learning objective is missed or the target audience makes a "bad decision," simulations can usually be easily reset to the start point (usually referred to as the "zero turn") or a previous data point after the start but prior to the decisive operation.

should experience the learning objective. This is what the instructor should think of as the "decisive operation" in the simulation. The best way to determine this is to take the learning objective and ensure there is something in the simulation scenario that causes the target audience to do something that achieves that objective. Sometimes it is a series of icons conducting an engagement with an enemy force, or it could be a "paper inject" handed to the key player by the instructor forcing him to make a new decision. It is a good idea to test the simulation on a fellow instructor as part of the scenario-development process. All the events built

into the scenario should lead up to creating the conditions for the target audience to achieve the learning objective. If the learning objective is missed or the target audience makes a bad decision, simulations can usually be easily reset to the start point (usually referred to as the "zero turn") or a previous data point after the start but prior to the decisive operation. The ability to reset the simulation and "do over" an event is a tremendous way to reinforce learning as well as being cost effective.

A simulation with "greater fidelity" is not always better. As you work with simulations, there is often a subtle desire to improve its fidelity — the degree of detailed information displayed or an increase in functionality that can be performed. It is common for later versions of proven simulations to increase the amount of detailed information it displays. Too often the level of detail winds up being information that is appropriate for subordinate leaders and serves more as a detractor from the primary learning objective than the benefit it was intended to provide. For example, many simulations are primarily maneuver force centric with the ability to employ direct fires, indirect fires, fixed wing and rotary wing forces, obstacles, smoke, etc. The sustainment play can range from no play at all to counting individual casualties and gallons of fuel needed by each subordinate unit. Many of these detailed sustainment items would be handled by the junior leaders or appropriate staff section according to the unit's standard operating procedures (SOP). Just because we CAN display something does not mean we SHOULD. Remember it's about driving the target audience towards a specific learning objective.

Never run a fight to its conclusion. I have found this to be one of the most useful techniques in using simulations in the classroom. I normally try to stop the simulation right after reaching the decisive operation but before the key player is able to completely implement all the new actions. When I announce that I am ending the simulation, the key player normally protests because they are just now moving into position to deliver the decisive blow. The reason I recommend this is that when I allow the simulation to run all the way to its conclusion it normally shows a clearly achieved end state (win, lose, or draw). The second order effect is that during the after action review (AAR) the players normally allow the playback video (or screen captures) to do all the talking, and then all they do is discuss what they saw unfold on the screen. On the other hand, when I stop the simulation before the final action, the players feel obligated during the AAR to stand up and PROVE to everyone in attendance that their upcoming actions were going

Some Proven Best Practices

During the simulation, know when and where the student

to be able to defeat the enemy regardless of what they were planning. At this point I ask the key player to identify what decisions and options his opponent had left. The key player will dig deep in his cognitive tool box and go to great lengths to explain how his upcoming actions were ready to meet any option his opponent had left. Sometimes the key player gets his eyes opened when his opponent challenges him on his remaining decisions and options and introduces something he had not considered. Either way it makes for a very engaging AAR. Many times after class has been dismissed, players remain to finish the simulation run to see if they would be vindicated in their comments! That speaks to the power of using a simulation to achieve learning.

When training commanders, have someone else operate the keyboard. With the advent of the number of computer systems in the classroom today, it is very easy to put everyone behind a screen — because we can!

Quite often the person gets drawn into operating the simulation as opposed to processing information and executing the operations process. This is especially delicate when training commanders due to the need to have information presented to them for situational awareness in order to make decisions. A useful technique is to have someone else operate the keyboard. This allows the commander to spend more time thinking about the arrangement of forces in time, space, and effect and not having to think through all the necessary keystrokes. Do not allow commanders to touch the keyboard or mouse during the simulation. This forces them to practice their verbal commands as part of their visualizing, describing, and directing mission command skills.

Get everyone in the hot seat! Lessons and courses that are focused on decision making or training commanders are ideal for the use of simulations. They allow players to get a chance in the hot seat. Everyone loves to win and prove they have the intelligence and skill necessary to defeat an opponent, even if they are enemy icons on a display screen. Though the players appreciate the learning that occurs, it's all about bragging rights among their peers when it's over! Instructors should use this to their advantage and put as many people in the hot seat as possible. One of the courses in ILE's Command and General Staff Officer's Course that focuses on applying mission command skills in a hybrid threat environment runs multiple simulation vignettes in three-person groups mentored by an experienced instructor. On each vignette, one officer serves as the commander (the primary target audience), another as his subordinate units (this officer is also the person that operates the simulation), and the third serves as an observer/recorder whose primary task is to observe the mission command skills of the commander and provide feedback at the AAR. After each vignette, the commander does a self-evaluation on his performance of the stated learning objectives (exercising mission command skills), and then receives feedback from his "subordinate" player, designated observer/recorder, and then finally the instructor. Each person rotates to a new position for the next vignette and then repeats the process, so each person will perform each duty at least once and



During the exercise, the commander (sitting on other side of desk) does not see the simulation unfold and must receive his situation awareness verbally from the subordinate commander.

then receive a final grade from the instructor on the ability to do each of the three tasks to standard.

Takeaways

As someone who did NOT come from the FA 57 (Simulations) background and was initially resistant to training with simulations, I was fortunate to see simulations used in the classroom by some astute instructors. Like anything else that is worthwhile, there is an up-front investment in setting the conditions for success. It did take me several hours to learn the basic functionality and keystroke commands of my first simulation, but once you learn one, the next one gets easier. Once I became comfortable with the simulation, I easily learned how to adjust the database to be able to modify the scenario to help drive to the learning objective. Done well, it is a powerful tool for experiential learning, short of live training or combat. At the end of the day, all that really matters is:

- Did the target audience learn something that will help them?
- Did the players get to practice (over several iterations) a skill set that is critical to their job?

When a simulation exercise is crafted wisely, and the conditions are set BEFORE the exercise starts, then the chance of it producing a positive outcome increases dramatically.

For more insights, tips, and discussions on how to better use simulations in the classroom, go to <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/digital-leader-development-center>.

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Training Notes



U.S. ARMY RANGER SCHOOL

FLORIDA PHASE

6TH RANGER TRAINING BATTALION

The third and final phase of Ranger School is located in a coastal swamp environment of Florida's panhandle at Eglin Air Force Base. It is intended to function as the "run phase" of Ranger School. Students are given more complex and evolving missions and expected to use their critical thinking skills to develop creative solutions based on the five principles of patrolling.

The Florida Phase is broken down into three mini-phases, each with its own focus: techniques, adaptability, and resiliency training. The techniques portion takes place prior to insertion into the field training exercise (FTX) where instructors focus on nongraded practical exercises. The adaptability phase takes place during the first five days of the FTX and focuses on challenging students' ability to adapt to changing missions and conditions. Finally, the resiliency portion takes place during the final five days of the FTX and challenges students' ability to endure physical and mental hardships. The Florida Phase is designed to give students the opportunity to truly test their mettle as leaders before many of them will take leadership roles in deployable units.

Techniques training (Days 1-5) in Florida begins with an in-country brief that builds on their experiences at Fort Benning and Dahlonga, Ga. The next two days feature short classes that build on the raid, movement-to-contact, and ambush classes received in previous phases. Each class is followed up by three student-led practical exercises (PE) that allow the students to practice leadership positions and receive mentorship and instruction from Ranger instructors (RIs). During these PEs, an additional RI is

surged on each platoon to maximize supervision, training, and mentorship. Successful students take advantage of the opportunity for a penalty-free experience. They volunteer for as many leadership positions as possible during the first two days and solicit advice during and after the PEs to refine their standard operating procedures (SOPs) developed in the Mountain Phase. Instructors will endeavor to give every student a practice leadership position, but enthusiastic and active participation yields huge dividends during the FTX.

Day 4 introduces students to waterborne techniques vital for success in Florida. Students will learn and practice the proper way to conduct a small boat movement, tactically cross a water obstacle, and how to move through swamps. Mastery of these skills is essential for success in the extremely challenging terrain that they experience throughout the FTX. RIs will then lead the platoon through a PE covering patrol base establishment and priorities of work to reinforce training received in the Mountain Phase.

The final day of techniques week (Day 5) allows each platoon to prepare itself for the upcoming FTX. Graded student leadership takes charge and receives the initial operation order (OPORD). They have the rest of the day to conduct troop leading procedures (TLPs), fine-tune SOPs, and prepare for the airborne operation that will insert them into the FTX. The effort students put into techniques training is one of the best indicators of their performance during

Ranger students cross a stream as a part of rope bridge training during the Florida Phase.

Photo by John D. Helms





Photo by John D. Helms

Ranger students conduct a boat movement during the final phase of Ranger School.

the first few days of the FTX. Students have greater success when they use their time on Day 5 to rehearse, plan, fine-tune SOPs, and conduct proper pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections. There is ample opportunity and time to prepare for the FTX; students must simply take advantage of this opportunity.

Following an airborne insertion, the FTX's first five days (Days 6-10) aim to train students' adaptability. This mainly consists of dismounted patrols covering five to 12 kilometers, and students receive roughly one to three hours of sleep each night. The goal of these patrols is to test the students' ability to adapt to changing missions and conditions and to think critically to devise creative solutions to unexpected problems. Students will receive changes to their mission from their higher headquarters throughout this portion of the FTX and will be expected to use any intelligence they have gathered to drive follow-on time sensitive missions.

Platoons that do not rehearse or prepare adequately on Day 5 typically struggle for the first days of the FTX. Student leaders will not have the time and space to adapt quickly to a rapidly evolving mission without well thought out and practiced SOPs. For Ranger students in leadership positions, success during this phase requires adaptability and problem solving. Platoons should not expect that every problem can be solved with dogmatic adherence to the Ranger Handbook but expect to make decisions using the guiding framework of the five principles of patrolling. Student leaders must prepare for the unexpected and make timely and sound decisions that use common sense. RIs will ensure that the unexpected takes place during training to familiarize students with a multitude of combat scenarios.

The final five days of the FTX (Days 11-15) will test Ranger students' resiliency. The operations that Ranger students conduct during this time include multiple complex movements such as traveling through the swamp and conducting one-rope bridge stream crossings, air assaults, trucking convoys, and boat movements along the Yellow River and across the Santa Rosa Sound to Santa Rosa Island. These movements are inherently dangerous, but the Ranger cadre employ a robust safety network to mitigate risk and ensure student safety. These challenging movements will tax the already exhausted Ranger students and add further complexity to the operations that the student leadership must plan for and control.

Even though the focus of this portion is to train resiliency, student

leadership is continually challenged to continue to manage change in order to accomplish these new and complex operations while motivating their peers to endure the final days. Resiliency to overcome conditions of hardship is a trait expected of all Rangers. What limits the Ranger student from achieving success during these final Ranger School days is a lack of clear and concise communication. Leaders must provide a clear task and purpose. Once this guidance is issued, Ranger students must spot check to ensure these tasks are conducted to standard and make necessary changes. Ranger students are far enough along in Ranger School that everyone has an understanding of what needs to be executed. The particular challenge is the Ranger student's individual choice between self-discipline and survival. In other words, students choose either to

do what is right or choose complacency and self-comfort. This has a tremendous effect on the Ranger student leader's ability to successfully complete his mission and ultimately pass his patrol. This is what makes Ranger School such a valuable developmental leadership experience; leadership is not just knowing what should be done but taking that knowledge and executing as one cohesive unit.

The Florida Phase functions as the capstone exercise of Ranger School and the final challenge for students before they graduate the course. The complexity and rigors of the phase offer a final learning experience for the students prior to many of them taking on the unfamiliar mantle of leadership. Instruction in Florida is less directive, and the RIs will take more of a mentoring role while allowing students to struggle to find their own solutions to difficult tactical problems. The challenge of leading a group of peers who have reached common levels of mental and physical exhaustion due to sleep and caloric restriction, while at the same time thinking critically to devise creative tactical solutions, is extremely difficult for many students. These challenges are only manageable because of the instruction and experiences gained in the two earlier phases. In the end, these challenges are essential to creating combat-ready leaders.



Photo courtesy of Ranger Training Brigade

A Ranger student briefs fellow students before a mission.

PT AND THE 8-STEP TRAINING MODEL:

IMPLEMENTING TRAINING MANAGEMENT EVERY DAY

CPT DARRELL E. FAWLEY III

Many Infantry leaders lament the loss of the art of training management over the past decade and continue to remind us that we will have to get back to it. Properly managed training should be a top priority for units in their train/ready phase. However, few of our company-level leaders have been properly trained in the 8-Step Training Model. Training is one of the most important things we do, and it has been said that physical training (PT) is the most important training we do on a daily basis. Yet, oftentimes we don't even use training management in planning and executing our PT sessions. Therefore, physical training is the best way to teach proper training management to NCOs and junior officers. Once they understand the process, they will be able to apply it to a wide range of training events, improving the quality of the unit's training and increasing the results of all events. This article will outline how to use the 8-Step Training Model for PT.

Step 1: Plan the Training

Training plans for PT are usually written on a weekly schedule, and PT sessions are normally planned four weeks out. To ensure that training is executed as planned, I recommend not having the session planned too far out, or it will likely not come to fruition. PT should adapt to the changing needs of the platoon and mission. When planning training, PT or otherwise, a few questions must be answered.

What skills are being trained? Before this question can be answered, the commander needs to determine what physical skill sets he wants to go by. For example, the Army's PT manual — Training Circular (TC) 3-22.20, *Army Physical Readiness Training* — has different skills than those identified by CrossFit. Even within the manual, there are



Photo by SGT TJ Moller

A Soldier with U.S. Forces-Iraq performs the rower during an assessment of the proposed Army Physical Readiness Test at Camp Victory, Iraq, on 10 May 2011.

different ways of training. The commander may select to go by the "Shoot, Move, Survive, Adapt, and Battle Drill" criteria or the "Strength, Mobility, and Endurance" criteria. Once the commander lays out what skills he wants to train, his subordinate leaders must identify which of those skills will be trained in a particular session. This is no different than tactical training where a platoon may train one skill level task one day and another the next day. However, multiple skills may be trained in a single session. For example, a platoon can do a three-mile run and then execute pull-ups and dips afterward. Leaders must first identify what they want to train. Too often training — especially physical training — derives first from the method, and later the objective derives from this. The foundation for any PT session must be the skills to be trained.

Who is to be trained? The two things that must be answered here are what level (such as team, squad, or platoon) the training will be conducted at and what level the focus is on. For example, platoon road marches are focused on the unit where ability group runs are on the individual.

Answering this question is important to determine constraints and requirements (for example, a team can train in the gym where a platoon cannot without reserving space).

Who is the primary trainer? Training is a leader's task and all training has a leader. PT is a good opportunity to get junior leaders or those next-in-line low-level leader experience such as moving a formation, stretching, planning, etc. Therefore, leader development can be achieved along with PT. I recommend though having a supervisor when it is not a leader and having assistant trainers, one per 15 Soldiers, for larger elements.

When will training be executed? This is fairly simple for most daily PT events. However, this must be identified especially for PT outside of prime PT hours. The length of time is also important.

Where will training be executed? Location determines what resources are available and what type of session the unit can hold. PT in a gym will normally require change in PT hours or some type of coordination. PT in the field limits the equipment available. Planning the location

will help leaders determine what is possible. Also, this allows the commander to deconflict. For example, if two platoons want to use the unit’s gym or combatives area, someone has to give. If PT is planned, this can prevent PT from being altered on the spot.

What resources will be needed? Whether it is equipment, space, or something else, all of it needs to be planned and resourced. Combat-oriented PT normally requires equipment such as logs, tires, etc. Where do these come from and who gets them? All training requires resourcing, and PT is no different.

Are there any other material requirements? This typically concerns what the unit already has but must ensure is present. This could be materials to ensure safety such as ice blankets, road guard vests, or chem lights, or it could be needed equipment such as water cans or Improved Outer Tactical Vests. By identifying these requirements and putting someone in charge, it ensures that the proper equipment is present for training.

Is the training challenging? This is something that must be answered relative to the goal. If the goal for the session is to teach physical readiness training (PRT) warm ups and cool downs, then physically challenging might not be the criteria. The best way to look at training to evaluate whether it is challenging is asking whether it meets the intent of the session. Therefore, it may challenge Soldiers to learn a new skill, challenge their endurance, or challenge team work. But, it needs to be worthwhile.

Has a risk assessment been done? As an Army, even in operations, we mitigate risks that we must accept to achieve our objectives. PT is no different. Some commanders may desire a Composite Risk Management Worksheet (CRMW) to be filled out for all sessions; others do so for only the big or out-of-ordinary events. However, leaders must at least think through risks and figure out how to mitigate them.

Step 2: Train the Trainers

Trainers must be knowledgeable in their subject and be able to conduct PT in front of their group. Otherwise, Soldiers will lose motivation or the trainer will lose credibility. Leaders must ensure they validate their subordinates before letting them lead PT.

Has the training outline been reviewed? This must be determined by the individual commander. However, I suggest the commander ensure that the first sergeant and platoon leader review the outline prior to submission to him for review. Figure 1 is an example training outline. I suggest identifying who is leading PT, identifying what skills are to be trained, and laying out the timeline among other things to be part of the outline. The review should ensure the training is realistic, well planned, and challenging.

Is the trainer skilled in the specific area (and fit)? I sat through a PT session where one of my NCOs tried to teach my company PRT only to have him stop every few minutes to consult another NCO. The trainer was losing his audience. While leaders do not need to be masters to train others, they should possess requisite skill in the area they are leading. If a leader cannot do the exercises he requires of others, he has no credibility and no ability to train. Further, leaders who are overweight or out of shape should not lead PT regardless of rank or position. This sets a bad example and undermines the training.

Does the trainer have and understand the task/conditions/standards (T/C/S)? If the trainer cannot articulate the T/C/S for his PT event, it is likely that he does not have a solid plan or understand his plan. He must be able to brief the T/C/S to his Soldiers and to senior leaders.

Are there references? Not all PT events will have a reference, but most will and leaders should review them and be able to refer their subordinates to the document (such as TC 3-22.20) or Web site (such as www.crossfit.com) so that they can research independently to improve.

Does the plan achieve the objective? If it does not, leaders must get their trainers back on azimuth.

Step 3: Recon the Site

Leaders must ensure the intended training location will suffice.

Is the site suitable for training? This is not just a question of will it support the objective but also will it create the desired effect? I once took a PT test on the indoor track at Fort Drum, N.Y. We were certainly able to run two miles on it (after 16 laps), but we also

Figure 1 — Example Training Outline

Monday — 3 JAN	Tuesday — 4 JAN	Wednesday — 5 JAN	Thursday — 6 JAN	Friday — 7 JAN
Day of no scheduled activities	Focus: Strength	Focus: Power	Focus: Stamina	Focus: Agility, Strength
	Location: BDE footprint	Location: BDE footprint	Location: BDE footprint (SP/RP)	Location: BDE footprint
	Uniform: IPFU with boots	Uniform: IPFU	Uniform: ACUs, FLC, 55lb ruck	Uniform: IPFU
	Reference: Military Athlete	Reference: Military Athlete	Reference: RAW PT guide	Reference: CrossFit/Mil Athlete
	0630-0640: PRT warm-up	0630-0640: RAW movement prep	0630-0640: RAW movement prep	0630-0640: RAW movement prep
	0640-0705: 3-mile run, moderate pace	0640-0650: 60lb sandbag get up	0640-0755: 5-mile footmarch (15 minutes per mile)	0640-0645: Course set up
	0705-0710: Cool down	0650-0710: 10 rounds mini leg blaster; 5 ankles to the bar	0755-UTC: Recovery	0645-0655: 300m shuttle run, 2.5 minutes
	0710-0720: 5 pull-ups, 10 dips, 15 push-ups	0710-0720: 80lb sandbag slams		0655-0700: Recovery, movement
	0720-0730: 2 x rope climb, 2 x ladder climb	0720-0730: 10lb medball throw and chase		0700-0710: 3 rounds 1/4 calf tabata, HUG drill
	0730-0740: Return to company area	0730-0745: RAW recovery		0710-0715: Movement to gym
	0740-UTC: Cool down			0715-0730: CrossFit Lynne plus back extensions
				0730-0745: Return and recover

had to dodge Soldiers conducting profile PT and each other, which significantly slowed everyone down. Had the site truly been assessed prior to the event, our leadership may have altered the time or location of the test to allow for more suitable conditions.

Is it easily accessible? If the unit cannot easily get there, then training must be moved or arrangements must be made such as meeting at the location versus formation or extending PT hours.

Is it easily accessible to emergency response? While a negative answer shouldn't necessarily cancel the event, considerations must be taken to ensure Soldier safety especially for high-risk PT events.

Step 4: Issue the Plan

Plans must be issued to the troops ahead of time. First, Soldiers should know what they are training on. This gives them predictability and something to look forward to. Second, this helps Soldiers plan personal PT sessions. Third, seeing a plan gives confidence to Soldiers that PT is not being made up on the fly. Soldiers find confidence in leaders who plan.

Has the plan been issued? Plans can be issued through operation orders or memorandums of instruction for commanders who want to stress those systems or simply through passing out the training outline. Regardless of method, Soldiers must be briefed on the general plan for upcoming PT sessions. I recommend posting the plan in a common area regardless of method.

Has the uniform/special equipment required been briefed? Soldiers who show up without the desired equipment or without being in the right uniform will surely not receive the desired effects of training. Soldiers will default to their seasonal PT uniform if not briefed so leaders must ensure they inform their Soldiers to ensure PT can go as planned.

Step 5: Rehearse the Training

Rehearsals are basic to any plan and an old adage is that nothing in the Army ever goes right that isn't rehearsed. Rehearsals allow us to find holes in our plans before

our subordinates do. Further, they allow us to be as prepared as possible. Leaders need to determine at what level they need to conduct rehearsals. A PT competition may require a detailed walk through where a run may just need a quick talk through.

Identify weak points in the training plan. With any plan, a rehearsal should increase understanding of the plan as well as also iron out the rough spots. Talking or walking through the plan with someone other than the planner is the best way to bring out these weak points in a PT plan. By identifying these points of friction, the planner can then mitigate them and prevent issues from arising during training. Location, timeline, and equipment will be the biggest hang-ups for many PT events.

Does the training flow? If there are great lulls in the plan or too many movements from station to station, the workout may lack intensity and lead to a lack of motivation or disinterest, which will diminish results.

Is there sufficient time for training? If nothing else, make sure your timeline will work. It's better to alter a plan before execution than during. Or, if it is important, request more time.

Are the training aids/materials present and operational? Make sure that everything is going to work. Don't wait until PT to find out the logs are all splintered or that the tires have been moved. If equipment is coming from somewhere else such as the training

support center or another unit, ensure it has been picked up and is serviceable. We complete preventive maintenance checks and services on our equipment before operations and should do the same before PT.

Were pre-execution checks reviewed? Don't get in the habit of starting PT from scratch. Develop a pre-execution checklist to ensure everything goes smoothly. These checklists can include such questions as: Have the T/C/S been established? Has the site been reconned? Has the uniform been published?

Step 6: Execute the Training

This is it — game time.

Is the training being conducted to standard? Leaders must spot check their subordinates to ensure PT is conducted correctly and in accordance with the plan.

Are all Soldiers accounted for? If the whole unit isn't present, leaders must check to see that Soldiers are accounted for. Soldiers should either be at PT (standard or profile) or at sick call unless they are excused from duty for a legitimate reason.

Is everyone in the right uniform? This can tell you a lot about your subordinates' preparation and how much they care.


Does everyone have the right equipment? See above.

Step 7: Evaluate the Training

Per Army standards, training will be evaluated at a minimum of twice a year with the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) but other assessments should occur. As an Infantry unit, you will likely not accept a 300 score on the APFT as validation that Soldiers are fit for operations across the full spectrum. Further, after action reviews (AARs) should constantly occur.

What method of assessment is being used? Is it the APFT? A five-mile run? A 12-mile foot march? Or is it something more complicated such as the Ranger-Athlete-Warrior (RAW) assessment? Whatever it is, the standard must be determined.

Does the assessment evaluate skills needed for full spectrum operations? The APFT doesn't really hit at this. My recommendation is to use tests that exist



such as the RAW assessments, Military Athlete's Operator Ugly or one of the Horsemen program's two PT tests. Or create your own based on the needs of the mission and unit.

Were the materials sufficient? Do they need to be replaced? Are there enough of them? Are they effective?

Was an AAR done? Quick AARs should be done between trainer and trainees at the end of every session and can be done during cool down. Leaders may also want to conduct periodic AARs amongst themselves. The end of the week is a great opportunity for this.

Are training results recorded? Soldiers should be encouraged to keep their own PT log. All assessments must be recorded to compare results and PT schedules should be archived.

Step 8: Adjust the Training Plan

Though doctrinally this step is "Retrain as Necessary," PT is ongoing. Information gained through Step 7 as well as any changes to the mission should be used to periodically adjust the plan.

Be prepared for opportunity training. At times, the opportunity arises to do a second PT event for the day while in garrison. In the field or at the range, sometimes a window of time opens up or extra ammunition allows for a spontaneous stress event. Having a few hip-pocket PT sessions per leader (even small, 15-minute sessions) for both field and garrison environments can help.

Review relevant texts. Always search for manuals, articles, Web sites and books that provide insight into building a better program. I have never found a program that I feel is a stand-alone combat fitness program. However, programs such as CrossFit, CrossFit Endurance, RAW, the Horseman, and Military Athlete Squad PT all are good places to gain ideas for preparing your Soldiers for the physical rigors of FSO.

By using these steps in the planning and execution of a PT schedule, leaders can ensure a better process for physically preparing their Soldiers for the diverse needs of conflict across the full spectrum of war. Further, by implementing this method for physical training, leaders can ensure their subordinate leaders understand the 8-Step Training Model. The knowledge gained in this process will enhance other training events as NCOs and junior officers will have a greater understanding of how to properly manage training. Therefore, applying this training model to the physical training process can lead to better, more efficient training and a crop of new leaders versed in how to properly plan, resource, and execute training.

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Photo by Tommy Gilligan

SFC Leroy Petry shared leadership lessons with senior cadets during a visit to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., on 14 September 2011.

REPETITIVE, REALISTIC TRAINING KEY

SGM PATRICK M. OGDEN

When Medal of Honor recipient SFC Leroy Petry realized his hand had just been blown off while he tried to throw an enemy hand grenade from harm's way, one thing kept him executing his mission and directing his men while under extreme stress. He said it was a natural reaction for him because his training took over. Likewise, Petry recently advised a class of U.S. Military Academy cadets to make Soldier training as realistic as possible once they reached their units.

Fortunately, in the current high-tech Army, training simulators help those young lieutenants do just that. These high-fidelity simulators are what have helped our tank, Bradley, and aviation communities become so lethal. Simply put, simulated training provides a replication of reality that has never before been experienced in the Army's training environment.

Simulators such as the Advanced Gunnery Training System and Bradley Advanced Training System have given U.S. combat Soldiers the fighting edge. Through the repetitious learning experience the simulators provide, the ability to work the weapon systems is so ingrained in a Soldier's mind that they can perform all their vital roles and put steel on target as if it's second nature.

That same level of training is absolutely critical to our dismounted squads when they engage the enemy with small arms. They need to have a blink-of-an-eye reaction when they send a round down range without having to remember to concentrate on the "breathe, aim, squeeze" tenets of achieving excellence in marksmanship.

Today's squad or team leader must be able to detect, direct, report, and engage the enemy simultaneously. Every member of that squad must be so well trained in marksmanship that when they go through the motions of firing their weapons in the heat of battle, it's as natural as blinking. So how do we ensure that every member of a squad, as well as every Soldier in the Army, undergoes repetitious small arms marksmanship training to get

them to an optimal level without breaking the commander's training budget? The use of training simulators has been proven time and again to be not only an excellent training tool that has significantly elevated the marksmanship accuracy of our Soldiers but is also extremely cost effective while saving lives, time, and equipment wear and tear.

The Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000 simulates weapon-training events that lead to individual and crew live-fire weapons qualifications. It provides initial and sustainment marksmanship training, static unit collective gunnery and tactical training, and shoot/don't shoot training. This training is so realistic that it is used in the Army's annual Best Warrior Competition.

Unfortunately, it sits idle too often at our bases around the world. We need to put our Soldiers in the EST 2000 with their NCOs and use the range-training scenarios to refine their hand and eye coordination, and build the muscle memory required for instinctive reaction when firing their weapons. Units who consistently include the EST 2000 on their training schedules are finding it a valuable element in their training tool box.

The commander of 418th Civil Affairs Battalion in Kansas City recently recognized the value of the simulator when he learned his unit would not receive range ammunition for its battle assembly. He turned to the EST 2000 to keep from canceling the unit's scheduled M-16 rifle qualifications. Thanks to the simulator, 90 percent of his Soldiers qualified on the M-16 that day.

Through the use of the EST 2000 and the next generation of small arms training simulators, we can change our Soldiers' small arms proficiency by removing the psychological barriers of shooting while correcting the tendency of many Soldiers, new and experienced, to jerk instead of squeezing the trigger. The EST 2000 can also:

- Teach off-handed shooting in a safe, sterile environment prior to taking Soldiers to live fire.
- Work reflexive fire skills until Soldiers become honed in the close-up, 100-meter fight found in today's combat arena.
- Teach the skill of scan and shoot with both eyes open in the close fight.
- Instill confidence in the Soldiers' abilities to shoot, move, and communicate.

A key added benefit of training on the EST 2000 that cannot be replicated during live-fire training is the use of avatars and smart, interactive targets that will begin the process of preparing our Soldiers for the mental aspect of engaging the enemy. When an avatar can groan and blood splatters from the hit, the Soldiers are being exposed to the realities of combat before they are exposed to it the first time in a live, direct-fire engagement. This is critical to enabling them to deal with shock and continue to fight.

The difference in the future of our small arms engagement is going to hinge upon the Army embracing the training simulators to gain the trigger-time required to make our Soldiers the best small arms marksmen on the face of the earth — that's what will give us the decisive advantage in the close fight.

When there is an event involving small arms, our Soldiers should be the first to shoot and kill the enemy with lethal accuracy every time they squeeze the trigger. Skills gleaned through repetitive, realistic training in simulators will achieve that goal.

SGM Patrick Ogden is the senior enlisted advisor for the U.S. Army Program Executive Officer for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI). SGM Ogden's career in the Infantry has included assignments as a division master gunner, a drill sergeant, a first sergeant, and a regimental operations sergeant major. He has completed three combat tours.



Photo by SGT Justin A. Naylor

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment conduct training on an Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 in Kuwait on 2 November 2011.

TRAINING LETHALITY THROUGH CAVALRY SQUADRON GUNNERY

LTC CHRIS BUDIHAS AND 1LT SCOTT BROWNE

Cavalry scouts must be able to competently communicate, move, and shoot in that order; however, gunnery remains a critical foundational training event for all Cavalry — armored, Stryker, and wheeled formations. After completing its Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) rest phase following a deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10-11, gunnery was the first major mounted training event on the 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment's training calendar.

As a Stryker reconnaissance squadron with a unique assortment of troops, developing a gunnery training plan for a variation of units and vehicle types was a challenge. Despite the planning difficulties and harsh Bavarian winter weather, the Saber Squadron executed its first "to-standard" squadron gunnery in more than three years at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany from 16 February to 4 March 2012. Thanks to a solid pre-gunnery train-up, in-depth staff planning and a sound concept of support, the gunnery provided a solid foundation for future advanced training events.

The 4th Squadron currently consists of three reconnaissance troops; an anti-armor troop with tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank guided missile launchers; an engineer troop; and a headquarters troop with Military Police, support, and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) reconnaissance platoons. With a wide variety of platforms that include seven Stryker variants — command vehicle (CV), nuclear biological chemical reconnaissance vehicle (NBCRV), reconnaissance vehicle (RV), anti-tank guided missile vehicle

(ATGM), fire support vehicle (FSV), mortar carrier vehicle (MCV), and engineer squad vehicle (ESV), some with and most without stabilized remote weapon systems (RWS) — finding the right gunnery manual was the first challenge.

The Stryker Master Trainer Course uses both Field Manual (FM) 3-20.21, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Gunnery*, and FM 3-22.3, *Stryker Gunnery*. After careful consideration, the Saber Squadron deliberately selected FM 3-20.21 as the governing document for our gunnery density, as it was best suited for the vehicle density within the squadron. Additionally, it met the commander's guidance for developing a standardized process to ensure crews met a "gated approach" to qualification, meaning crews had to successfully pass one gunnery table before progressing to the next table. With 44 vehicles having unstabilized weapons systems, Chapter 17's exclusive focus on unstabilized gunnery was key, and with some small modifications it was suitable for almost all of the squadron's vehicle variants except the ATGM. For the ATGM, the *Stryker Brigade Combat Team Anti-Armor Company and Platoon Leader's Handbook* (ST 3-22.6, dated June 2009) was utilized. Crew stability was a concern due to the unit's location in the ARFORGEN cycle, so troops attempted to build crews with stability through the October 2011 Combat Training Center exercise at Hohenfels. We also understood that we would need to re-execute another gunnery density prior to the evaluated November squadron-level live fire due to key personnel turnover.

The first step in qualifying crews was individual training, as specified by the gunnery training program outlined in Chapter 14 of FM 3-20.21. Commonly known as gunnery skills testing, the purpose of this training is to familiarize and then test the

Soldiers with M Troop, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, move their Stryker vehicle into position during a blank fire exercise as part of their company external evaluations on 25 May 2012.

Photos by Gertrud Zach



trooper's competence with the three weapons found throughout the formation — the MK19 40mm grenade machine gun, M2 heavy barrel (HB) .50 caliber machine gun, and M240B machine gun. Testing was conducted across the squadron over a three-day period in a round-robin style with squadron-level certified evaluators/instructors. In accordance with the squadron commander's "gated approach" training guidance, crews were required to pass each station prior to moving to the next phase of pre-gunnery training.

Using the truck tasks listed in Chapter 14, each trooper needed to clear, disassemble, assemble, and perform functions check; load and perform immediate action; and identify a weapon malfunction and take action on his assigned weapon system(s). Also included in this testing was Common Task 1, Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V). A benefit of being forward-deployed in Germany with many former Eastern Bloc nations training at the Grafenwoehr Training Complex is that Saber troopers inherently operate in a multinational environment, which requires careful study of foreign vehicles as many of the NATO partners employ former Soviet/Russian equipment. Lastly, we conducted extensive remedial training immediately with certified instructors for any "NO GOs," and when ready those troopers were retested.

The next step in our gated approach was digital gunnery. Since there is no unit conduct-of-fire trainer (UCOFT) for the Stryker, training was primarily conducted using Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2), augmented by the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). This digital training provided crews (drivers, gunners, and vehicle commanders [VCs]) the opportunity to progress in a simulated environment on the same range that they would later actually conduct live-fire gunnery on in Tables III-VI. While the act of firing a MK19 or M2HB on a computer with a mouse click is immensely different from depressing the butterflies in real life, the opportunity to conduct berm drills, fire commands, spot and adjust indirect fire, and identify targets in simulation immensely increased crew cohesion and was the first opportunity for many of the new troopers to see what gunnery would encompass.

Vehicle crew evaluator (VCE) training was conducted simultaneously to digital gunnery. The squadron master trainer rigorously trained and certified three teams of two NCOs (E-5 or above) from each troop over a six-day period. These VCEs were responsible for scoring engagements and conducting crew after action reviews (AARs) during gunnery. Experiencing the VCE certification program provided an added personal benefit to the VCEs, many who are gunners themselves, as it substantially



A Soldier with the 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment scans the terrain using a Ground/Vehicle Laser Locator Designator during an exercise at the Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany on 31 May 2012.

increased their awareness of the gunnery process and associated scoring system. Without a solid group of trained and certified VCEs, conducting a quality gunnery would have been nearly impossible.

The last task prior to crew gunnery was Table II (crew proficiency course) for the gunners and VCs. One three-day range per weapon system was conducted the month prior to Tables III-VI of gunnery. These M2HB and MK19 ranges were critical for crew proficiency, as many of the gunners and VCs had not fired these weapon systems in years or never at all. Shooting from a tripod allowed Soldiers to become familiar with the weapon before adding the complexity of firing from stationary and moving vehicles.

Gunnery skills testing, digital gunnery, and VCE training prepared the squadron for the live-fire portion of gunnery. According to the manual, Table IV (long-range machine gunnery) is required for scouts and reconnaissance elements only, but limited range availability forced its omission during this density. The specific firing tables for Tables III, V, and VI were constructed based on the minimum proficiency level (MPL) on page 17-3 of the gunnery manual. These engagements were divided among the day- and night-fire portions, taking into consideration the MPL application matrix (page 17-9), which suggests what engagements are suitable for a VC or gunner. Tables V and VI were standardized into two categories — one was for unstabilized weapons (RV, FSV, and MP M1114 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle variants) and the other was for stabilized weapons (CV, ESV, and CBRN). Due to the increase in the RWS' accuracy over an MK93 mounted weapon, the stabilized variants fired on a range with engagements at greater distances and three-fourths scaled targets, while unstabilized systems engaged at short ranges with full-size targets.

For this gunnery density, 4th Squadron conducted the live fire on two separate ranges within the Grafenwoehr range complex for a two-and-a-half-week period. One troop (company) formation would support each range, while another troop fired. Each troop had four days to fire and four days in support. The first day of gunnery was Table III dry fire. The next three days consisted of live fire with Table III (basic machine gun), V (basic crew practice), and VI (crew qualification) day and night fires.

Following each run, the crews were given formal AARs by their VCEs. As per the squadron commander's directives, squadron AARs followed the Army's current publication, *The Leader's Guide to After-Action Reviews*, and 2nd Cavalry Regiment's AAR standard operating procedure (SOP). The AARs were facilitated on a terrain model and augmented by forward looking infrared (FLIR) video footage and audio recordings from the jump net taken during the gunnery run. VCEs were deliberately positioned inside the vehicles during the execution to get the best vantage point to judge crew proficiency and enhance the substance of the AARs. The quality of the AARs with troop first sergeant overwatch and crew participation immensely helped crews substantially improve as gunnery progressed.

Ammunition allocations followed the allotments set forth in FM 3-20.21 (50 rounds of .50 caliber or eight rounds of 40mm per target). Personnel constantly occupied the ranges, which allowed the squadron to bring all of the ammunition to the ranges on the first day. As it was always under guard, this decreased logistical requirements. In addition to qualifying crews, gunnery allowed every platoon leader (78 percent of them second lieutenants) to serve as an officer-in-charge (OIC) of a range and NCOs as range safety officers (RSOs), beach masters, and ammunition NCOs. This range support experience was especially valuable to leader development within the squadron, given the rapid turnover of both officers and NCOs following the previous deployment.

The squadron's gunnery resulted in 49 of 51 crews qualified on Table VI, with the anti-armor troop being unable to conduct an ATGM live fire due to persistent fog. However, the anti-armor troop was able to conduct a simulated live fire prior to the inclement weather. This was accomplished using Laser Target Interface Device System (LTIDS) and Wireless Independent Target System (WITS). The squadron's demanding gated approach and high success rate during gunnery has allowed the unit to progress into more advanced training, such as platoon- and troop-level live fires and external field evaluations.

Gunnery provided the squadron staff a foundation on which to build more advanced training events. It also offered a prime opportunity to practice resupply operations at both the troop and squadron level. The squadron's support platoon gained valuable experience in running daily logistic packages of Class I and III to units at two noncontiguous ranges in adverse weather conditions (a combination of snow, fog and/or freezing rain). Other logistical issues, such as vehicle repair, were conducted forward on the range or vehicles were brought back to the base for higher-level maintenance.

Certain practices worked especially well for the Saber Squadron. The range complexes were well established and contained open-bay barracks, dining areas, range towers, and ammunition storage

pads. Troops were not only more comfortable sleeping inside the barracks during sub-freezing weather conditions, but doing so reduced fuel consumption and put less operational hours on the vehicles. While running a troop-sized range internally is possible, it is more efficient if personnel can focus on either firing gunnery or supporting it. For a squadron-sized event, running several ranges is essential to getting all units through in a short amount of time. This allowed the squadron to conduct complementary, concurrent training while conducting live-fire operations. Lastly, the squadron was able to exercise mission command operations through battle tracking in the tactical operations center (TOC) and by utilizing the combat trains command post (CTCP) and support platoon for resupply operations.

While the gunnery was a success, there is always room for improvement. First, many of the gunners did not simply have enough previous experience firing their weapon system to confidently engage targets right away. This can be partially mitigated by a very strong pre-gunnery train up. Digital gunnery using VBS2 is another possible solution, but RWS-equipped vehicles seemed to benefit more from this than flex-mounted weapon systems. This is most likely due to the fact that manipulating a traverse and elevation device takes hands-on practice. While the RWS has its advantages, the zeroing process was a point of friction for some personnel with limited gunner experience. Some range time and ammunition was wasted by a few crews not following the prescribed zeroing steps in the technical manual. Additionally, occasional issues with the jump net hampered communications. Increased radio training, proper preventive maintenance checks and services and prompt replacement of damaged cables, as well as having a communications specialist at the range would minimize downtime. Overall, many of the problems were quite minor, but when combined could add up to hours of lost training time.

Gunnery was a major building block for the 4th Squadron and the first of many major training events that will require Saber troopers to effectively shoot, move, and communicate. Proper pre-gunnery training, like gunnery skills testing and digital gunnery, are instrumental in preparing crews for the rigors and stress of actual live-fire gunnery. Planning and resourcing, while unglamorous, are extremely critical to successful range operations. The land and ammo and master gunner portions of the squadron operations section deserve much of the credit for the success of the squadron's gunnery density. Like all things in the Army, even a crew event like gunnery, it was a team effort from start to finish. Squadron leaders and Soldiers who experienced a gunnery executed to standard will not easily forget the lessons learned from this exercise. Saber Recon!

LTC Chris Budihas is the commander of 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany. He has more than 24 years of enlisted and officer experience in all forms of Infantry operations. His education includes a bachelor's degree in political science, master's in business administration, and a master's in military arts and science from the School of Advanced Military Studies.

1LT Scott Browne is the troop executive officer for K Troop, 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment. He is a 2009 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y.

EGYPTIAN GENERAL MOHAMED FAWZI

PART III: REFLECTIONS ON MISTAKES MADE IN PLANNING, TRAINING, EQUIPPING, AND ORGANIZING EGYPTIAN COMBAT FORMATIONS PRIOR TO THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR

CDR YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, U.S. NAVY

In this third in the series on Egyptian General Mohamed Fawzi, CDR Aboul-Enein, an adjunct faculty member at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), continues his in-depth look at the issues leading up to the development of the Egyptian army and how the poor preparation of the Egyptian armed forces contributed to their resounding defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War. This has shaped not only a generation of Israelis but a generation of Arabs; the repercussions of this conflict still reverberate today. CDR Aboul-Enein offers an Arab perspective of events, and it is my pleasure to introduce this essay in the series highlighting Fawzi's memoirs. These memoirs, summarized in English for the first time, offer a candid critique of the Egyptian armed forces' strategic, operational, and tactical performance prior to the 1967 Six-Day War. CDR Aboul-Enein provides a unique perspective directly from historic Arabic sources; allowing us to better comprehend the decision-making processes that led to Egypt's 1967 defeat. It is important that America's military leaders understand a conflict from various perspectives, and this series provides that opportunity.

At the National Defense University, we strive to provide America's senior military and civilian leaders an education grounded in the complexities of a globalized world. CDR Aboul-Enein's course on Islam, Islamist political theory, and militant Islamist ideology contributes to that through the immersion of his students in the nuances of Islam and its differing ideologies. In addition, using his personal knowledge of the region, CDR Aboul-Enein has been instrumental in helping students understand the changes brought about by recent events in the Mideast referred to by some as the "Arab Spring." His writings, such as the one you are about to read, continue his efforts to ensure the most comprehensive education possible for our military and civilian leadership in this complex and constantly changing region of the world. I applaud *INFANTRY* Magazine for providing CDR Aboul-Enein a forum for this multi-part work and look forward to the debate and discussion it will produce.

— MG Joseph D. Brown IV, U.S. Air Force

Commandant of ICAF, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

As tensions with Israel escalated throughout the latter half of the 1960s, Egypt attempted to prepare for war, yet was unsuccessful. In his memoirs, General Mohamed Fawzi details the country's unpreparedness through its lack of military training, the chaos of Egypt's leadership, and Israel's ability to formulate precise and successful military strategy. It becomes evident in Fawzi's memoirs that Egypt was doomed to lose the 1967 war against Israel, and that all of its internal and external complicated

dynamics finally culminated in Israel's swift victory.

The Absence of Adequate and Essential Training for the 1967 War

Fawzi wrote that consistent and hard training is the measure of competence of any armed forces. His memoirs show an appreciation of the way training helps integrate reserve and active units through peacetime exercises and military education. Placing combat units in various tactical and operational exercises tests

readiness as well as command and control. War Minister Field Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer delegated responsibility for the training of the armed forces but never followed up or held anyone accountable for training the Egyptian military. As army commander in chief, Fawzi commissioned a training report detailing the need to create training requirements for each rank of soldier up to officer. This training should be coupled with units and divisional training, and eventually reach the level of combined services training. The report was endorsed by Amer and sent to the Military Training Department for execution. However, it was never followed up with or acted upon. Instead, training commenced each calendar year at the unit level, culminating with a massive multi-divisional exercise in May, but even this was scaled down from 1965 to 1967. Egyptian planners deluded themselves that the Yemen War (1962-1967) represented live field training for Egyptian combat arms. Fawzi argued that the Yemen War, a guerilla war, was not an adequate substitute for preparing for a conventional war with the Israelis. The Yemen War and a war with Israel were two different tactical, operational, and strategic environments.

From 1964 to 1967, combat units in Egypt were exercised mainly in defensive warfare, and Fawzi compared this to developing a human Maginot Line. Units were not properly trained for offensive warfare. Fawzi told readers that from 1965 to 1966, not one Egyptian tank fired a shot in a combined armor and infantry exercise. Only 11 percent of fuel allocated for training was used in that training year. Amer had the opportunity to notice this fact when he visited frontline units deployed in the Sinai and Suez Canal. He visited the units three times between 1962 and 1967, yet he failed to alter anything. Fawzi's

reviews of exercise reports leading to the 1967 Six-Day War note that the reports were written to please senior leaders and that bad news was completely hidden. Some reports contained Arab nationalist and socialist slogans, as if field commanders were being evaluated for political loyalty and not for combat effectiveness.

Another Achilles' heel of Egyptian combat arms was illiteracy. Only nine percent of personnel within the army had high school diplomas — 18 percent in the navy and 21 percent in the air force. Those who joined the armed forces with a high school education completed high school with a barely passing grade, the equivalent of a "D" in an American grade system. Fawzi noted his concern over the qualitative education of Egyptian soldiers in an age of increasingly complex weapons systems being provided at the time from the Soviets. One argument against recruiting educated and technically trained personnel was that it would be a security risk to the Egyptian regime. The armed forces before the 1967 war had no motto, mission statement, or general objectives. Complicating matters were the two million man national guard, an Egyptian popular army at the time. The entire force experienced a shortage of medical, technical, and logistical units. The Egyptian air force (EAF) showed acute shortcomings in trained pilots. New planes simply went into storage, and Fawzi mentioned that an entire wing of Sukhoi-7 fighters remained in their crates. There wasn't an armed forces inspector general office before 1967. Fawzi wrote that there was a:

- 40 percent shortage of men;
- 30 percent shortage in small arms;
- 45 percent shortage in tanks;
- 24 percent shortage in artillery; and
- 70 percent shortage in transport capabilities.

Without adequate training or supplies, the Egyptians entered into the 1967 Six-Day War at an obvious disadvantage to Israel. Before the start of the war on 5 June 1967, the EAF had 260 planes and 150 pilots concentrated at 10 airbases, with four of these bases in the Sinai and three in the Suez Canal Zone. The remaining fighters and bombers were concentrated along the Nile Delta and within Egypt proper. Fawzi wrote that 74 Sukhoi bombers and 21 MiG fighters remained in crates or under construction. Most Egyptian airbases had only one runway, and many of the fighters and bombers were parked on the runway and had barely been flown due to the shortage of technicians and maintenance personnel. Air defense consisted of 27 SAM-1 and SAM-2 and 100 85mm and 37mm anti-air batteries. Only six anti-air guns were allocated to protecting ground formations, and all SAM missile batteries were assigned to protect urban centers.

Egyptian naval assets before the Six-Day War consisted of 80 warships (destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, submarines, troop carriers, and torpedo boats). These were mainly concentrated in Alexandria, and 50 percent of these naval assets were not ready to deploy. The Yemen War had absorbed a frigate, troop carrier, and minesweeper. No maritime reconnaissance capability existed. Clearly, Egypt was grievously unprepared for war due to the lack of training and equipment.

Clearly, Egypt was grievously unprepared for war due to the lack of training and equipment. ...The failure to train officers and troops on new Soviet equipment ran deep.

Failure of Arms Training

Fawzi wrote that the failure to train officers and troops on new Soviet equipment ran deep. Some units had not trained on weapons of any kind since the 1956 Suez Crisis. Reserve units, such as the one used to concentrate forces in the Sinai, had severe shortages of weapons, equipment, and radios. Units that did train were only able

to conduct one type of operation. For instance, the 11th Infantry Division was trained in 1966 to defend El-Arish and could not conduct any improvised offensive operation or counterattack. Of 120,000 reserve units called up on 15 May, only 80,000 responded at all. Fawzi highlighted that there wasn't a rehearsal of forces in preparing for an Israeli attack. Forces were deployed and moved haphazardly. For example, the 14th Infantry Division moved from Cairo to Jebel Libna on 18 May, and when they began to set up a perimeter, the entire division was moved again, this time to Sheikh Zuwaid on 27 May, and then finally to al-Husnah on 2 June. They moved four times and 500 kilometers before the outbreak of the war. The 1st Light Infantry Battalion moved twice (150 kilometers). The 141st Armored Division was recalled from Yemen, and with no re-acclimatization, redeployed to Jebel Libna, reaching this sector on 4 June and entering the combat zone the first day of the Six-Day War on 5 June.

Chaos of Command

Fawzi's memoirs offer perhaps the clearest analysis of the chaos of Amer's command architecture. On 16 May, Amer appointed Field Marshal Abdel-Mohsen Murtaji as theater commander of the Sinai-Israel front. At the time, Murtaji was army chief of staff and commander in chief for ground forces. Fawzi revealed that there was no concept of organization for the theater commander within the Egyptian chain of command until Amer appointed Murtaji. To make matters worse, between May and 5 June 1967, Amer replaced 12 field commanders and field chiefs of staff. Amer compromised with President Gamal Abdel-Nasser on a mass military demonstration and felt that no actual combat operations would take place; he therefore went about concentrating as many combat units as possible into the Sinai. Amer conceptualized 10,000 officers, 130,000 regulars, and 80,000 reserve troops. The Egyptian military chief hyper-focused on numbers and not coordination, counterattack, or even static defense.

Superpower Maneuvers

On 26 May, the United States Ambassador to Egypt delivered a message from President Lyndon Johnson to Nasser, urging Egypt not to initiate hostilities. The Johnson Administration extended an invitation to Vice President Zakariyah Moheiddine to come to Washington, D.C., for talks on the emerging crisis. The Soviet Ambassador to Egypt requested a 3 a.m. meeting with Nasser to deliver a message from the Soviet Premier, urging Egypt not to initiate hostilities. French Premier Charles DeGaulle announced that French policy of support would be based on who was the aggressor.

During this time, War Minister Shams Badran was in Moscow to

present Egypt's case for closing the Aqaba Gulf and to illicit political leverage against Israel. Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko (who served as defense minister from 1967 to 1976) expressed solidarity with Egypt, and Badran read too much into such grandiosity and interpreted this to mean that the Soviets would directly intervene on the side of Egypt. This shaped Nasser's thinking, as Nasser, Badran and Amer discussed Badran's Moscow trip and the meaning of Grechko's farewell pledge of solidarity. Nasser had delayed speeches to parliament, the Arab Lawyer's Association, Arab Labor Association, and the press until he heard from Badran about his trip to Moscow. Fawzi stressed that after getting news of Grechko's pledge, Nasser hardened his rhetoric, announcing, "The Soviet Union stands with us in this battle and will not allow any nation to interfere." Badran reassured the cabinet, the Council of Ministers, adding "if the American Mediterranean fleet enters the war on the side of Israel, our TU-16s and torpedo boats can destroy America's largest carriers."

The tempo of enthusiasm and wishful thinking compelled Jordan's King Hussein to visit Cairo on 31 May. Fawzi wrote that Nasser was bolstered psychologically by all the frontline Arab states surrounding Israel and prepared for hostilities. There were statements of support from Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, with pledges of aid, troops, equipment, and financial support from Kuwait, Iraq, and Algeria, which announced intentions to send forces to Egypt. Sudan sent a token ground force, while both Kuwait and Iraq sent small contingents of air and ground forces to Jordan. Egyptian leaders focused on the euphoria of support and not actual capabilities of forces sent or pledged.

Military War Plans

Fawzi offered one of the most intimate accounts of Nasser and Amer's discussions on Egyptian troop deployments. As early as 1965, while awaiting the return of battle-hardened forces from Yemen to Egypt's Port Tawfik, they entertained the idea of redeploying combat-tested forces returning to Suez and Sharm al-Sheikh. Nasser saw the redeployment as political

language that would shake the world, but it was decided that these forces needed to have time to reacclimate to Egyptian society after more than a year or more of guerilla warfare. In 1966, while Amer was visiting Pakistan, he sent an encrypted message to Nasser urging the deployment of rested units from Yemen into the Sinai. He added that this should be accompanied by Nasser threatening the closure of the Tiran Strait. This encrypted note began a series of actions that would end with the 1967 debacle.

The leadership in Egypt, pressed by Nasser, wanted a withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai. Nasser announced this publicly after Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol made threatening remarks against Syria. In addition, the Syrian Defense Minister informed Amer of a buildup of 11-13 Israeli divisions along the Syrian border. The Egyptian armed forces were surprised by a 14 May 1967 general order for mobilization at 11 a.m. At noon, orders were given that began movement of forces to the Sinai, which were to be completed within 72 hours. This sent Egyptian staff planners into chaos, as such a mobilization was not trained or planned for until the order was issued on 14 May. Adding to the chaos of deployment was that the orders were issued from Amer's secretariat office and not the National Defense Council. Rumors flew as a lack of direction was forthcoming from Amer. One powerful rumor among Egypt's generals was that the deployment was more of a demonstration on behalf of Syria and to honor the 1966 Joint Defense Pact. There was widespread delusion that no combat would occur while

evicting UNEF, and controlling the Aqaba Gulf would occur short of war.

Fawzi was dispatched to Damascus on 14 May to evaluate the extent of Israeli deployments on the Syrian border and to examine Soviet intelligence provided to the Syrians. Fawzi wrote that there was no indication of an Israeli troop concentration when he toured Golan Heights or even when he evaluated Soviet reconnaissance photos taken on 12 and 13 May. On 15 May, Fawzi returned to Cairo and reported his findings to Amer. Before Nasser issued his order to deploy forces to the Sinai, Fawzi estimated that only a tenth of Egypt's infantry and armor was deployed in the Sinai, representing one corps and one armored division.

On 15 May, Amer ordered the concentration of ground forces to be completed within 48 hours. Upon arrival in the Sinai, units were not given follow-on orders, and so the general staff relied on Plan Qahir, which was approved in 1966. However, the problem was that only part of Egyptian combat units had trained for this plan. The result was mass formations concentrated on ill-prepared terrain with no orders. An initial 3,595 officers and 66,675 troops were thrown into the Sinai without training, preparation, or orders.

On 16 May 1967, Amer sent a letter, via Fawzi, to the UNEF commander, Indian General Rikki, demanding the withdrawal of his forces from the Sinai. The next day, General Rikki informed Amer that he was unable to withdraw UNEF unless ordered by the UN Secretary General U Thant. Incredibly, on 18 May, the UN Secretary General ordered the withdrawal of UNEF.

On 18 May, Egypt began a hodgepodge deployment into the Sinai, and Nasser convened a meeting with his military chiefs. Nasser pondered the idea of blockading the Gulf of Aqaba. Among the subtle nuances discussed by Fawzi was the question of whether Nasser's gambit to close the gulf was a nationalist or national objective. Fawzi argued that Nasser's strategic thinking was influenced not by national but by nationalist goals. This meant that it was shaped not by the interests of Egypt, but by those of Egypt and the wider pan-Arab national movement that Nasser felt he embodied. Fawzi and the deputy chief



Photo courtesy of the State of Israel Government Press Office
The commander of the United Nations Emergency Force meets with officers at a border checkpoint before the evacuation of UNEF from the Sinai.



Figure 1 — Strait of Tiran

of operations briefed Nasser on the feasibility of an Aqaba Gulf blockade. They concluded that the drawdown of combat forces in Yemen, which required naval assets to move men and equipment coupled with protecting the Sinai and Mediterranean coasts, made a total blockade unfeasible.

What came out of the 18 May general staff meeting with Nasser was a plan to conduct a mass, combined arms demonstration but not an outright plan for an offensive against Israel. A battalion of paratroopers, artillery, border guards, and mechanized armor was sent into the Sinai. Logistical units were pulled from other formations and placed around this newly created four-battalion combined arms force. A 130mm coastal artillery unit, a MiG-19 wing stationed at Ghardaga airbase, warplanes with a naval task force of two transports, one destroyer, one frigate, and several Stix missile and mine-laying boats were added to this force. Fawzi wrote that communication among sea, air, and land combat units and headquarters was poor. Field commanders' orders were countermanded by higher headquarters of ground, air, and naval assets in Cairo and Alexandria, which complicated matters.

The political decision to close the Aqaba Gulf occurred on 17 May 1967 and was timed to coordinate with the visit of UN General Secretary U Thant. Nasser publicly asserted that Aqaba was closed to Israeli shipping and all nations shipping strategic materials to Israel. Even as Nasser made these assertions, both he and Amer affirmed the concept of freedom of the seas and navigation. However, on 22 May, Egyptian naval ships were

ordered to intercept and search cargo bound ships entering the Tiran Strait. Amer and Nasser had different tactical visions, with Nasser opting for a military demonstration and Amer wanting a gradual military escalation. Their debate also focused on control versus closure of the Tiran Strait. No final operational or tactical guidance was issued, and as a result the commanding general of the Sharm el-Sheikh sector asked for rules of engagement to enforce Nasser's public order of conducting the blockage of the Aqaba Gulf. Fawzi highlighted the questions coming from field commanders in the Sinai:

- Do they engage foreign, Israeli, or both merchant shipping?
- Do they engage foreign shipping for cargo-bound ships to Israel?
- Are oil tankers bound for Israel permitted?
- If merchant ships are escorted by destroyer escorts, are they to engage the warships?
- If Israeli merchant ships are reflagged, are they to engage them?
- Are they to engage leased merchant ships bound for Israel?

These questions and more descended on Amer's office between 20-23 May. Nasser's public assertions became a public declaration to close the Aqaba Gulf on 23 May. That same day, classified orders from Amer's office (not the general staff) were given to intercept all cargo vessels bound for the Israeli port of Eilat. These vessels were to be given warning shots, and if they did not respond they were to be sunk. If escorted by warships, they were not to be intercepted even if they were Israeli flagged. On 2 June, the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, and the United States joined to assert freedom of navigation and declared they would challenge the blockade. The stage was set for a massive showdown that, to a minor degree, mirrored the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the United States threatening to intercept Soviet ships bound for Cuba.

Fawzi wrote of Nasser's historic visit on 22 May to Bir Gifgafa and Inchass air bases in Egypt. The latter contained the largest concentrations of MiG-21 fighters. Nasser was joined by Amer and Air Marshal Sidqui Mahmoud. The pilots conducted a scramble drill for the Egyptian leader, after which Nasser discussed the political situations with his pilots. Oddly, in his remarks he never mentioned a conflict with Israel. The Egyptian leader thought he could take Israel, the United States, and the Soviet Union to the brink and never considered the tipping point that would lead to an Israeli strike. That week Amer ordered the 7th Infantry Group and 14th Armored Division to Rafah in Gaza. The 113th Infantry Division in Kuntilla was deployed defensively with no thought of maneuver. In addition, an improvised force led by Major General Saadedine al-Shazli that combined special forces, infantry, and armored brigades was deployed between Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid in order to harass communication lines for forces crossing the Sinai from Gaza. Combining these different brigades and getting them integrated in the field would take practice and repeated exercises, something the Egyptians did not do until on the eve of the Six-Day War. In the United States, it would take months to integrate the staffs of a new amphibious squadron with a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) in what is known as pre-deployment work-ups. Some are conducted in the expeditionary warfare training group as tabletop exercises, and others are conducted underway.

Intelligence Reports' Effect on Psychology of Egyptian Leadership

Fawzi discussed 15 intelligence reports that shaped the thinking of Egypt's military and political leadership. They offered lessons on how reports were psychologically and cognitively processed. Only three will be highlighted; they are:

15 May: An intelligence report revealed a concentration of Israeli combat formations along the Syrian border of between five and seven divisions. This turned out to be false, shaped by Syrian and Soviet desires to pressure the Israelis after the trouncing Syrian air forces had taken earlier that month at the hands of the Israelis.

17 May: Civilian morale in Israel was in a low state; this was a fallacy.

18 May: Overestimation of IDF units devoted to the Egyptian front. One took the Syrian deployment of Israeli forces with six infantry divisions, an armored division, and one tank battalion. This far exceeded Israel's ground order of battle, yet Egyptian planners wanted to accept that Israeli forces existed on both the Egyptian and Syrian borders.

Based on this intelligence, Fawzi discussed the conferences convened to discuss these reports. A 15 May conference began at 8:30 p.m. and focused on reinforcing Gaza and the southern Sinai sector of Kunteila. The debates zeroed in on the limited roads that bisected the Sinai from west to east. The general staff discussions began with the chief of military operations, who discussed the need for aerial strikes into Israel. Amer interjected and ordered such discussions to be suppressed. The general staff was incensed at limiting Egyptian options, particularly since Amer signed the aerial strike portion of an Egyptian offensive against Israel, called Plan Asad (Lion). Fawzi also highlighted the 28 May conference, which convened at 9 p.m. with a discussion on the defense and blockade of the Aqaba Gulf. At this meeting Zakariyah Moheiddine, a member of the 1952 Revolutionary Free Officers, was designated chief of civil defense. Moheiddine was Egyptian vice president, and scheduled to meet American President



Figure 2 — Flag of Egypt

Lyndon Johnson the first week of June. Amer's ability to give orders to Egypt's vice president demonstrates the power Amer had within Nasser's government. In addition, Amer issued countermanding orders that the defense of the Sinai would be phased and gradual, and plans for an Egyptian counterstrike should the Israelis attack first were stood down.

On 2 June 1967, a meeting with Nasser convened. Fawzi considered this to be the most important meeting. Nasser ended the discussion declaring that Israel would strike first between 4-5 June. The general staff focused on developing a counterstrike package with Mahmoud estimating that Egypt could sustain a 20-percent loss from an Israeli first strike. The Egyptian air marshal briefed other chiefs of the possibility in which the Egyptian air force would be wiped out and advocated weighing the benefits of an Egyptian first strike versus world opinion. Nasser chose to focus on the optimistic 20 percent loss rate as being an adequate price for going to war with Israel and by extension with the United States. On 3 June, Sidqui and Amer discussed moving fighter planes to the rear (Egypt proper versus the Sinai) and the need to disperse air assets. Sidqui argued that moving fighter planes from the Sinai to Egypt proper would demoralize the pilots. They discussed the issue of the Egyptian air force's capability of absorbing a first strike. The discussions between the two then focused on Amer's itinerary on 5 June 1967 to visit combat units in the Sinai. He was scheduled to arrive at the Bir Tamada Air Field between 8 and 9 a.m. That morning Israel attacked Egypt. Amer and his senior aides were on

their way to the Sinai in a military plane as Israeli jets roared towards the Mediterranean to loop around into Egypt and the Sinai, conducting one of the most decisive aerial attacks in military history.

Fawzi Reflects on Egyptian Combat Readiness on the Eve of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

According to Fawzi's detailed recollections, in the 21 days leading to 5 June 1967, the Egyptian army was not in any state of readiness for war. On 5 June 1967, General

Tawfik Abdel-Nabi, the military attaché to Pakistan, arrived to take command of a specialized anti-tank battalion. His new battalion had no heavy armor, mechanized armor, or even vehicles necessary for the unit to conduct its assigned mission. Its weapons were so paltry that it could not be called an anti-tank battalion. From Yemen, the first elements of the 18th Infantry Corps began to arrive. Field Marshal Murtaji and General Salah Mohsen, his field commander in the Sinai, spent the morning focused on Amer's itinerary. Sixteen communications battalions needed for the deployed Egyptian infantry corps and reserves remained behind the west bank of the Suez Canal on the Egyptian side, and therefore had not been set up to communicate in the field.

Discussion of Indication and Warning Messages of 5 June 1967

The Egyptian War Ministry in Cairo received two warnings from military intelligence in Arish from Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Salama, who dispatched a message of an Israeli attack at 7 a.m. on 5 June 1967. It reached the general staff at 9:40 a.m. The second warning message came from General Abdel-Moneim Riad, future Egyptian chief of the general staff in Jordan. At the time he acted as forward commander and Egyptian representative to the Jordanian general staff in Amman, part of the conceptual Unified Arab Command. This message was a result of the Jordanian listening post in Ajloun, where it began to detect Israeli movements at 4 a.m. which then sent warnings to Egyptian posts in Arish. The Egyptian intelligence officers did not forward this message until 7 a.m. The Israeli attack began at 8 a.m. Frontline

ground units in the Sinai did not grasp it was an Israeli attack until 8:30 a.m., when Israeli jets were bombing and strafing their positions.

Fawzi estimated that 85 percent of the Egyptian air force was wiped out in four hours. He engaged in conspiracies popular among Egyptians of the time trying to make sense of the depth of defeat. Fawzi explained Israeli military competence and asserted that the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet provided air cover for Israeli assets, allowing the bulk of the Israeli air force to attack Egypt. This conspiracy is slightly better than Nasser's public declarations after the 1967 War, which asserted that American warplanes attacked Egypt. Fawzi believed that the Israelis planned and trained for the 1967 airstrike a decade earlier, and that it took that long to perfect. This comment by Fawzi is likely a case of mirror-imaging Egyptian abilities onto the Israelis.

The Aerial Attack

Fawzi discussed the Israeli aerial attack as being divided into two main thrusts; each would contain a combination of approximately 80 fighter jets and bombers. The first attack group concentrated on the Sinai, with a focus on radar installations, Suez Canal air bases, and four Sinai airfields. The second attack group focused on the rest of Egypt, with a focus on Cairo airfields. Fawzi's memoir is filled with tactical criticism and questions that reveal an Egyptian military mind who has spent years pondering the 1967 war. Questions include:

- * Why didn't Egyptian commanders immediately enact Plan Fahd (Leopard) to get a few Egyptian warplanes aloft? Fawzi discovered that Egyptian warplanes were not armed and fueled, but he does not explain why. It is likely Fawzi knew that Nasser's regime was concerned more with internal coups than with external threats, and therefore warplanes were not fueled or armed.

- * Of the few planes that escaped Cairo airfields during the attack, Fawzi asked how did the Israelis know of the few landing at Luxor air base? Luxor did not house any warplanes and was not in the initial Israeli attack plans, according to Fawzi. How he came to these conclusions was not discussed, but instead he pointed to the notion that Israelis had precise intelligence. He made no allowances for electronic reconnaissance of planes or the prowess of Israeli pilots to make independent judgments regarding fleeing Egyptian jet fighters.

- * Why were orders not given to disperse the Egyptian air force to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Usmia Airbase in Libya, or Khartoum Airfield in Sudan? Fawzi described how the single initiative of a wing commander allowed a wing of Antonov-12 bombers to leave Cairo airbase for Khartoum and escape the Israeli air assault.

From Fawzi's perspective, the Israelis further subdivided their two attacks into two waves; one released bombs and fired missiles, and the second saturated the airbases with heavy machine gun fire. He is highly impressed with Israeli anti-runway cluster bombs, which Egyptian units experienced for the first time. Fawzi commented that they created craters in the runways, rendering the them unusable. He lamented that most Egyptian airfields consisted of one main runway, and to make matters worse there were no real Egyptian technical units dedicated to repair runways. Fawzi broke the Israeli air attack down into 45 minutes:

- 20 minutes to target
- 5 minutes to attack
- 20 minutes to return to refuel and reload

From Fawzi's view, the Israelis were able to reload and refuel in 7-10 minutes. Egyptians sacrificed dispersal for a concentration of air assets and an offensive strike policy with no real threat of effective retaliation.

Fawzi spent a couple of pages commenting on the bombing and strafing of the U.S. Navy ship USS Liberty (AGTR-5). Fawzi saw the American naval surveillance ship as electronically jamming the Egyptian radar and aiding Israeli fighter/bombers by vectoring them to Egyptian targets. He wrote that the USS Liberty was key to Israeli air success. However, the Israeli air force's misidentification of the USS Liberty resulted in 34 deaths and 171 injuries of U.S. Navy Sailors. While the Israelis focused on the USS Liberty, Fawzi claimed that this enabled 30 Egyptian fighters to be sent aloft, with 12 being shot down by the Israelis and the rest withdrawing to the closest haven. Fawzi's two-page focus on the USS Liberty is not uncommon among Egyptians wanting to write a more direct and active role for the United States in the Six-Day War. Fawzi could not believe that the Egyptians could be defeated so badly by the Israelis alone without the direct aid of the United States. Nasser even gave a speech during the 1967 war claiming American warplanes were attacking along with Israeli planes.

Conclusion

Fawzi's memoirs provide a clear analysis of why Egypt was so gravely unprepared for war against Israel in 1967, allowing Israel to quickly gain victory. With or without American aid to Israel during the war, Egypt was unprepared for combat due to a lack of training, equipment, artillery, and sound leadership. Although Egyptian military and political leaders attempted to create detailed war plans and strategies (such as Plan Qahir), the failed implementation of these plans left Egypt susceptible to Israeli attack and rapid defeat. Also, the gradual deterioration of the relationship between Nasser and Amer as Amer gained evermore power, left a void in Egypt where solid leadership should have guided the country. Fawzi made it clear that Egypt's half-hearted attempts at strategic planning did not stand a chance next to Israel's detailed and sound planning of nearly a decade. Most importantly, Fawzi stressed that it was not one single event that caused Egypt to lose the 1967 Six-Day War against Israel but several details over several decades that ultimately left Egypt weak and unable to defend itself.

CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is author of *Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat*, published by Naval Institute Press in June 2010. He teaches part time at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and has a passion for highlighting Arabic work of military significance to America's military readers. CDR Aboul-Enein wishes to thank Dorothy Corley, who recently graduated with her bachelor's degree in International Relations from Boston University, for her edits and discussion that enhanced this work. Finally, CDR Aboul-Enein wishes to express his appreciation for the National Defense University Library and the John T. Hughes Library for providing a quiet place to read and write this series.

Book Reviews



***American Warrior: A Combat Memoir of Vietnam.* By BG (Retired) John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, Jr., with Wess Roberts. New York: Citadel Press, 492 pages, 2007, \$16.95.**

Reviewed by LTC (Retired) Rick Baillergeon.

Every war or conflict seems to produce those larger-than-life figures — Soldiers who are remembered for their colorful personalities and their legendary exploits on the battlefield. They are Soldiers whose sheer name sparks a myriad of "war stories" by those who served with them. From the Vietnam War, one man who can clearly be placed in that category is John "Doc" Bahnsen.


Within *American Warrior*, Bahnsen vividly details his two tours in Vietnam (1965-66 and 1968-69). During these tours, he served in various staff and command positions. These were highlighted by commanding a gunship platoon as a captain and leading both an air cavalry troop and a cavalry squadron as a major. He left Vietnam as one of the most decorated Soldiers of the war. His record includes the Distinguished Service Cross, five Silver Stars, three Distinguished Flying Crosses, three Bronze Stars with Valor device, and two Purple Hearts.

Bahnsen, with valued assistance from *New York Times* bestselling author Wess Roberts, has crafted a book truly unique among the memoir genre. The first thing readers will notice in this uniqueness is the structure of the volume. To augment Bahnsen's recollection of events, the book utilizes discussion of the event by the Soldiers who were there as well. In organization, each perspective is separated from one another. I found this technique highly effective, and it greatly personalizes the memoir.

Writers of memoirs generally have motives in publishing them. Many times, these motives can fall on the selfish side. For some, this may be to stroke their own ego or to deflate someone else's. I found neither of these within *American Warrior*. What I did find was a memoir focused on describing the intensity of battle and the human dimension of warfare. Bahnsen has clearly done justice to both of the subjects.

American Warrior is written in complete candor. Throughout the volume, Bahnsen does not attempt to cover up or sugarcoat any events or actions he participated in or personal traits he possesses. If mistakes were made on the battlefield or in his personal life, Bahnsen admits to them. This honesty is certainly refreshing and may not place him in a favorable light with some readers.

This candid discussion is also pivotal in making *American Warrior* an outstanding book in addressing combat leadership. Undoubtedly, many questions will surface in the mind of the reader as he reads the volume in regards to this subject. Did Bahnsen take unnecessary risks on the battlefield? What leadership traits were instrumental in Bahnsen's success in combat? What made a leader



successful in Vietnam? Are those keys to success any different today? Would 'Doc' Bahnsen thrive or even survive in today's Army? There is truly much to reflect upon within the pages of *American Warrior*.

One of the relationships readers will find most interesting throughout *American Warrior* is that of Bahnsen and George S. Patton IV (son of GEN George S. Patton Jr.). The two had a long established relationship prior to Vietnam, beginning while Bahnsen attended West Point. During Bahnsen's second tour in Vietnam, Patton (commander of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment [Blackhorse] at the time), selected him to command his air cavalry troop. Bahnsen provides numerous anecdotes regarding their relationship during this period. Readers will find that Patton IV was every bit as flamboyant as his father.


In summary, *American Warrior* is not your typical Soldiers' memoir. I found its organization, candor, and purpose distinctive among the numerous memoirs I have read. It is a book that readers will find action-packed, fast-paced, and well-written. Just as importantly, it is a book that will leave an impact and many moments of reflection for the future.

***Honor and Fidelity: The 65th Infantry in Korea, 1950-1953.* By Gilberto N. Villahermosa. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2009, 329 pages, \$33 or available online at http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/korea/65Inf_Korea/index.html.**

Reviewed by MAJ David Glenn Williams.

In his book *Honor and Fidelity*, Gilberto Villahermosa argues that the 65th Infantry Regiment entered the Korean War as a cohesive, combat-effective outfit, but over time the Army's personnel assignment and rotation policies degraded the unit's effectiveness to the point of failure on the battlefield. Villahermosa claims that by mid-1951, a critical shortage of experienced NCOs and a large influx of inexperienced replacements rapidly diminished the organization's combat capability. Further complicating matters, the Army's policy of segregated units meant that the replacements were mostly Spanish speakers only rather than bilingual Soldiers. The inability of senior leaders to correct the root problems within the 65th Infantry led to disaster in late 1952; however, Villahermosa argues that the unit redeemed itself by the end of the Korean War, reflecting the Army's willingness to address the underlying issues.

The 65th Regiment initially benefitted from several factors that other units did not. Unlike the undermanned regiments of the 24th



Division thrown into the Korean War from occupation duty in Japan, the 65th arrived in Pusan over assigned strength. The regiment, based in Puerto Rico, was comprised of mostly bilingual Puerto Rican enlisted men and NCOs that had World War II experience. A majority of the officers came from the continental U.S., but the regiment also enjoyed a sizable minority of ethnic bilingual Puerto Ricans. The 65th also benefitted from its participation in a multi-echelon, combat focused Puerto Rican exercise earlier in 1950. Finally, the Army created a personnel replacement center on Puerto Rico specifically for the 65th prior to its departure that provided a steady stream of replacements.

The North Koreans blooded the regiment within days of its arrival in September during the Pusan perimeter breakout, but between September and November the unit displayed its advantages on the battlefield by killing or capturing more than 1,500 enemies while suffering less than 40 casualties. Following the recapture of Seoul, the 65th moved to the operational control of the U.S. X Corps to participate in the invasion of North Korea. Villahermosa argues that the regiment overcame several leadership mistakes at the regimental level, as well as the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) assault during the ill-fated U.S. X Corps operations in North Korea, because of the cohesion the 65th developed through training and battlefield experience.

Following its evacuation from North Korea and a brief retraining period in early 1951, the 65th played a key role in Eighth Army commander GEN Matthew Ridgway's scheme of maneuver to recapture Seoul and push the CCF north of the 38th parallel. At a time when most Eighth Army units suffered from low morale and a defeatist attitude, the 65th's battlefield performance impressed Ridgway enough that he ordered 3rd Division to distribute Puerto Rican replacements throughout the division. This was a significant change to the Army's ethnic assignment policy. While Ridgway did not agree with the segregated unit policy, the need for manpower in Eighth Army also contributed to his decision. By April, Eighth Army had liberated Seoul again and found itself nearing the 38th parallel.

April also marked a turning point for the 65th as one-fourth of its personnel rotated out of theater. This critical loss of combat experienced, bilingual soldiers, NCOs, and officers had a lasting negative effect on the unit. At the same time, the nature of the Korean War changed as maneuver gave way to stalemate. From this point on, the 65th's effectiveness declined culminating in its tragic defeat in October 1952 on a mountain range known as the Jackson Heights.

The 65th defended the recently gained mountain range as part of a wider division operation. G Company lost its position to the CCF, and the combination of confusing orders, the language barrier, and a breakdown in discipline resulted in the regiment's repeated failure at counterattacking. The U.S. IX Corps commander relieved the 65th of its position and sent more than 100 men to the stockade for failing to obey orders during the battle. The Jackson Heights inquiry resulted in several courts-martial and the complete overhaul of the 65th. Villahermosa argues that the 65th received an unfair evaluation by the investigator, and that the report drew unsubstantiated conclusions based on contemporary racial bias. He points out that the unit was not the only one to suffer from

discipline problems in Korea. The regiment also suffered from the Army's rotation policy because it never received enough training time to overcome the language problem and inexperience within its ranks resulting from such a large number of rotations. Villahermosa supports his conclusion that the regiment finally addressed the root causes of its problems and began to turn itself around during overhaul with several accounts of successful actions performed by the regiment just prior to the cease-fire signed on 27 July 1953.


Honor and Fidelity is an excellent reassessment of the 65th Regiment's battlefield performance during the Korean War. The greatest strength of this book is its linkage between broader issues, like racial bias and language barriers, and battlefield effectiveness. Infantry leaders should read this book for that fact alone, but they will also find many useful small unit vignettes from a strictly tactical point of view. The book bogs down in details in several places and is, at times, unclear whether the author is talking about the 65th specifically or the division or corps it was attached to, yet the study remains an easy read that is full of useful lessons to today's Infantry leaders.

Omar Bradley: General at War.
By Jim DeFelice. Washington, D.C.:
Regnery Publishing, 2011, 451
pages, \$26.95.

Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis
H. O'Sullivan

Marshall, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Patton all had several major biographies about all or parts of their lives, but Omar Bradley has only his two memoirs — naturally somewhat slanted. This doesn't mean he was ignored though. The 14 pages of sources in *Omar Bradley: General at War* show he was mentioned frequently. This work, however, is heralded as being his first in-depth biography. It is suggested that he was modest (a few say he had reason to be) and self-effacing so he was overlooked in favor of more interesting and important leaders. I'm uncertain how much of a need there is now to remedy this oversight. Most of the material is already available but use is made here of some unpublished diaries, notes, and memoirs — not often utilized. DeFelice does a good job pulling all sources together in a comprehensive and readable fashion. It's a recap of events well covered in other histories but from a fresh perspective. It's also a balanced account, generally favorable to Bradley but critical where required. It gives good coverage to battles but also covers the reasoning behind critical decisions on varying courses of action.

Bradley was the commanding general of II Corps for two short periods of action in Tunisia and Sicily. He then served in action with First Army for less than two months and commanding general of 12th Army Group (AG) in the European theater of operations from August 1944 until May 1945. His performance was mixed with a successful break out and sweep over northern



France, a disappointing mire in the Hurtgen Forest, the bulge where command of two armies was taken from him, and the slow final chapter of bridging the Rhine into the heart of Germany and V-Day.

He served as administrator of the Department of Veterans Affairs during a period of massive growth of veterans and their programs — hospitals, disability claims, the G.I. Bill for students, home loans, and such. The book gives a page to this period, which is about right. Other than his prestige and use of his name, Bradley didn't contribute much to the solution of many problems.

As Chief of Staff of the Army from February 1948 until August 1949, he followed Eisenhower who had done the heavy lifting in connection with demobilization, reorganization of the Army, and the struggle over the unification of the armed forces. He was the first official Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where he followed Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, who had been chief of staff to the commander in chief from June 1942 until March 1949. Bradley was faced with several strong secretaries of defense — MacArthur in the Far East and Eisenhower in NATO. He made five stars himself in September 1950 — the last chairman to hold that grade. Some questioned then and since whether that was deserved.

Too much material was placed in the notes at the end of the book that would have helped in the continuity and understanding of the text. Overall, the book is recommended for students of World War II — even for those, like myself, who have read much about it. There is new information and a different approach to some key issues.




Photo by SGT William Begley

Paratroopers with the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, patrol a village in the Tani district of Afghanistan on 28 May 2012.

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